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1 
INTRODUCTION. 
The first amendment to the United States Constitution secures religious 
liberty, commanding that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab­
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The 
proper scope of the first provision, the establishment clause, is disputed,2 
but it generally prevents government from discriminating on the basis of 
religion, financially supporting religion, or requiring adherence to an 
official religion. At the center of public debate over such issues as school 
1U.S. Const. amend. I. The first amendment applies as a restriction 
against actions only of the federal government, see Permoli v. First Munici­
pality of New Orleans, 44 U.S (3 How.) 589 (1845) and Barron v. Mayor of 
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 254 (1833). However, through a series of Supreme 
Court rulings culminating in the 1940's, the due process clause of the four­
teenth amendment ("No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.... " U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, 
cl. 3) gradually "absorbed" the first amendment into its meaning, so the 
fourteenth amendment restricts state actions in precisely the same way the 
first amendment restricts those of the federal government. See Everson v. 
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding local school board's reim­
bursement of parents for costs of transporting children to public, private, 
and parochial schools via public transportation system), Cantwell v. Connecti­
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down licensing requirement for door-to-door 
solicitation). Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 
245 (1934). Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 10 (1905) 
2Compare. e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), Engle 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking down nominally voluntary recitation 
of state-written prayer in public schools), School District v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down nominally voluntary Bible readings and recita­
tion of Lord's Prayer in public schools), and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 
(1971) (striking down public salary supplements of teachers in parochial 
schools) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-699 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
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prayer 3 and educational voucher systems,4 the establishment clause 1S proba­
bly the higher-profile of the two provisions. But the second one, the free 
exercise clause, is an important protector of religious liberty in its own 
right, "[f]or despite a general harmony between the two religious clauses 
... " the Free Exercise Clause no doubt has a reach of its own." S While the 
proper interpretation of this clause too is debated,6 it generally prevents 
government from interfering with an individual's preferred form of worship. 
In highly simplified terms, the establishment clause prohibits government from 
forcing adherence to a particular religion, and the free exercise clause 
prevents government from obstructing adherence to a freely chosen religion. 
Two general schools of thought have developed oPPosin~s of the 
proper interpretation of the free exercise clause. By 1940~ everyone 
agreed on two points: to meet the requirement of the free exercise clause, 
I lation had to have a secular purpose and had to be generally applica­
3See , e.g., School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) 
4See , e.g., Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 
(1973) (striking down state policy providing tax deductions to parents who 
send their children to parochial schools) 
5Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) 
6Compare, e.g., Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 
601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) (upholding mandatory flag salute in public 
schools against free exercise challenge by Jehovah's Witnesses), Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599,610 (1961) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (upholding applica­
tion of Sunday Closing Law to orthodox Jewish merchant), Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (overturning denial of unemployment compensation to 
Seventh-Day Adventist terminated because of refusal to work on Saturdays), 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) (exempting Amish from compliance with 
compulsory secondary education law), and Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. 
v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in result) 
(upholding denial of unemployment benefits to Native American terminated for 
sacramental use of peyote) with Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 586, Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 
at 599, Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (striking down denial of unemployment benefits to Jehovah's 
Witness who quit his job when transferred to department producing tank 
turrets), and Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1595. 
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ble. 7 In other words, legislation violated the free exercise clause if its 
purpose was the suppression or regulation of religious practices or if it 
discriminated on the basis of religion. Courts would strike down legislation 
that did not meet these standards. The primary disagreement in the free 
exercise field has centered around cases in which a religious adherent 
challenges a secular, general law that meets these standards yet still 
interferes with his ability to practice his religion. 8 
Some judges and legal scholars believe that the free exercise clause 
often requires courts to exempt religious objectors from compliance with 
general laws that interfere with their religious practices. 9 Justice Brennan 
described this pro-exemptions view as "nothing more than the governmental 
7See , e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) and Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis, 3109 U.S. 586 (1940) 
8See , e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 
1595 (1990), Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 490(1981), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 
586 (1940) 
9Infringements of free exercise can take two forms. Legislation may 
interfere with religious beliefs or with religious conduct, including both 
religiously motivated actions and abstinences. Since the Court's first 
significant free exercise case, it has consistently held that the Constitution 
protects religious belief absolutely but provides only qualified protection 
for religiously motivated conduct. For instance, Justice Roberts once wrote 
that "the [first a]mendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to believe and 
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the 
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of 
society." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (footnote 
omitted). In general, governmental interference with religious beliefs is 
never justified and is unconstitutional. See also Emplo.vment Div., Dep't of 
Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 402-03 (1963), and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879) 
("Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was 
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or 
subversive of good order."). Consequently, the debate over free exercise 
exemptions concerns only instances when legislation interferes with religious­
ly motivated conduct. Issues surrounding free exercise protection of reli­
gious beliefs are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences .... tt10 For 
at least some of the advocates of this position, the pro-exemptions view is 
based on an assumption that the democratic process is structurally tilted in 
favor of mainstream religious sects. 11 Democratic governments, according to 
this outlook, will not normally pass a law interfering with mainline religious 
practices, but they may unknowingly enact legislation that obstructs the 
exercise of minority faiths. 
social security numbers 
that using a unique 
of some Native Americans for whom a number would be used. 12 Legislative 
bodies do not commission religious-impact statements for every bill they pass. 
Under a pro-exemptions view, the free exercise clause would often correct 
these oversights by excusing religious objectors from compliance with laws 
interfering with their unconventional religious practices. 13 Of course, the 
clause would also secure free exercise of religion when an insensitive or even 
oppressive legislature enacted a secular, general law fully aware that its 
provisions would obstruct the religious practices of some sects. The center­
piece of this interpretation of the free exercise clause is a constitutional 
vided for the use 
in its Food Stamp program, i id not realize 
identifier would interfere with 
10Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) 
11See S.D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 305 
(1990) 
12See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (upholding against free exercise 
challenge use of social security number in certain governmental programs) 
13Not even Justices Brennan or Marshall, however, would have exempted 
Native Americans from laws requiring government to use social security 
numbers. Id. 
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right to exemption from religiously burdensome laws regardless of the motives 
of the legislative body which enacted them. 14 
Other judges and legal scholars, however, argue that government fulfills 
its "obligation of neutrality" merely by enacting generally applicable, 
secular laws. 15 They condemn exemptions as special treatment for minority 
religious sects, rather than "neutrality.,,16 They also believe that the 
broad religious diversity of the United States makes any system of religious 
exemptions unmanageable. 17 Religious minorities could use the democratic 
process to gain statutory exemptions: These judges and scholars would respect 
any legislatively enacted system of exemptions. They simply do not believe 
that cutting exceptions from general laws is a proper role for the judicia­
ry.18 
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered the issue of exemptions from the 
time of its first significant free exercise case in 1879. 19 Though initial­
ly critical of the pro-exemptions view, the Court gradually adopted it. In 
1940, the Court's free exercise doctrine began evolving toward an eventual 
14See , e.g., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) 
15Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990), 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion), Thomas v. 
Review Board, 450 U.S. 707,720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and P. 
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1961) 
16See , e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) 
17 See , e.g, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 
1595, 1605 (1990) 
18See , e.g., West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 651 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
19Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (upholding federal anti­
polygamy statute against Mormon's free exercise challenge) 
fntroduction. 	 6 
accePtanc~e constitutional right to religious exemptions,20 and in 1963, 
the Court granted its first free exercise exemption. 21 By 1981, the Court 
had solidified the pro-exemptions approach, known as strict scrutiny, in the 
free exercise field. 22 
However, problems with the doctrine had been apparent since at least 
1963, and they became increasingly obvious during the 1980's. Partly as a 
result of these problems and partly because of ideological shifts among the 
justices, the Court came full circle in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. 
v. Smith (Smith II) (1990) and abandoned both strict scrutiny and the pro-
exemptions position in the free exercise field. 23 
In Smith II, two Native Americans challenged, as a violation of free 
exercise, Oregon's denial of their request for unemployment compensation. 
Their employer, a private drug rehabilitation organization, had fired them 
when it learned of their sacramental use of the illega1 24 drug peyote. 
Oregon denied their request for unemployment compensation, deeming their 
peyote use "misconduct." The Oregon Supreme Court eventually ruled that the 
free exercise clause demanded that sacramental use of peyote had to be 
exempted from the "misconduct" provision of the compensation regulations. But 
Oregon appealed, and in 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately upheld the 
state's denial of benefits. 
20Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 u.S. 586 and Minersville School District 
v. 	 Gobitis, 3109 U.S. 586 
21Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
22Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 
23Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 
24Several western states, no doubt respectful of the religious practices 
of their Native American residents, had provided statutory exemptions from 
their drug laws for the sacramental use of peyote. See Smith II, 110 S.Ct. at 
1606 
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Smith II was notable not so much because of its result but because it 
radically altered the method of adjudicating most free exercise claims. In 
short, it virtually eliminated constitutionally compelled religious exemptions 
and repudiated free exercise strict scrutiny. It represented one of those 
remarkable moments in constitutional history when a Supreme Court minority!s 
position, developed in previous opinions, overtakes a former majority's views 
and becomes the new rule of constitutional law. While not directly overruling 
any precedents, the decision in Smith II so narrowed and reinterpreted 
previous rulings that the new doctrine it established virtually supplanted the 
pro-exemptions position embodied in the strict scrutiny approach. 
This paper focuses on the erosion of strict scrutiny in the 1980's and 
attempts to explain how it happened. It is divided into five sections. 
Section one presents a detailed definition of strict scrutiny and explains 
some of its problems. Section two examines the background which led to the 
eventual establishment of strict scrutiny in the free exercise field in 1963. 
Section three explains how strict scrutiny was firmly installed as a free 
exercise doctrine in several cases from 1963 to 1981. Section four analyzes 
the erosion of free exercise strict scrutiny during the 1980's. And Section 
five illustrates its practical elimination in 1990. Finally, the paper con­
cludes with some notes about the state of the free exercise clause after 1990. 
8 
§ 1. 	 FREE EXERCISE STRICT SCRUTINY AND ITS PROBLEMS. 
By requiring the courts to grant religious exemptions, strict scrutiny 
theoretically provided a very high level of protection for religious minori­
ties. But the doctrine's comprehensive nature created serious problems that 
rendered the Supreme Court a less-than-zealous protector of religious liberty. 
In fact, after introducing strict scrutiny into the free exercise field in 
1963, the Court declined to exempt religious objectors in many of the cases in 
which it heard free exercise challenges to general legislation. 2S This less 
than powerful record of judicial review suggests that the members of the 
Court, even those who most ardently supported free exercise strict scrutiny, 
had difficulties with the doctrine. 
Several characteristics defined the doctrine of strict scrutiny in the 
free exercise field. When the Court formulated the approach in 1963, it was 
consolidating several judicial standards that had appeared separately in 
previous free exercise cases. In those cases the Court had begun to require 
government to meet two distinct criteria in order to justify an infringement 
of free exercise rights. In addition to the secular-purpose and general-
applicability standards mentioned previously, the Court sometimes required 
that legislation be "narrowly drawn,,26 to achieve its goal while minimizing 
2S See , e.g, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), United States v. Lee, 455 
U.S. 	 252 (1982). and Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) 
26E. g ., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943) 
9 § 1. 	 Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny and Its Problems. 
any interference with religious practices. This rule later became known A.S 
the requirement of "least restrictiv?~t'27 because it required govern­
ment to design its policies so that ~.~Jsed the legislative means ~'hich were 
least restrictive of religious exercise yet still able to fulfill the legisla­
tive end sought. In other cases the Court mentioned a fourth criterion. All 
interference with religious practices would be unconstitutional unless 
permitting the practices would substantially undermine government's ability to 
achieve some secular goal that it was seeking to fulfill. 28 Allowing the 
religious practice would have to do more than merely inconvenience government. 
Sometimes the Court stated a variation of this criterion, asserting that the 
secular goal itself had to be very important if the Court were to permit an 
interference with religious exercise. 29 Either formulation would require 
government to show an important reason for interfering with religious practic­
es, a reason that the Court eventually labelled a "compelling state inter­
est.,,30 
It was not until the 1960's and 1970's, however, that the Court applied 
both the least-restrictive-means and compelling-interest standards in the same 
free exercise case. Only in Sherbert v. Verner (1963)31 did the two crite­
ria begin to coalesce into free exercise strict scrutiny, a comprehensive 
method for analyzing the constitutional challenges of religious objectors. 
Strict scrutiny had developed at an earlier date in other constitutional 
27 E. g ., Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) 
28See, e.g., West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 	 624, 639 (1943) 
29See , e.g., Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 
(1940 ) 
30Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 613 (1961) (Brennan. J .• dissenting) 
31 374 U. S . 398 
10 § 1. Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny and Its Problems. 
V)fields, such as equal protection,J- but the Court did not begin using it to 
grant free exercise exemptions from general laws until 1963. 33 In fusing 
the least-restrictive-means and compelling-interest standards, strict scrutiny 
demanded more of legislation than merely a secular purpose and general 
applicability. Under strict scrutiny the burden of proof shifted to govern­
ment,34 which had to prove the constitutionality of legislation that inter­
fered with religious practices. According to Chief Justice Burger, !'[t]he 
state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the 
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.,,35 
But the actual process of judicial decision-making under strict scrutiny 
was a bit more complex than his statement suggested. When the Court heard a 
case in which a religious adherent challenged a piece of legislation as 
burdening his free exercise of religion, the Court had to first determine if 
the legislation actually interfered with the challenger's practice of some 
tenet of faith. If the Court found that the legislation did in fact burden 
3»
-See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 21t~ (1944) 
33Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
34In ordinary constitutional review the Court requires the challenger to 
prove that government has violated the Constitution. Under this rational­
basis standard, the challenger has to show that the end sought by some piece 
of legislation is not constitutionally within the power of the enacting 
legislative body. Alternately, the challenger might demonstrate that the 
means which government adopted to meet its legislative goal bear no rational 
relationship to the achievement of that goal. This standard, very deferential 
to the decisions of legislative bodies, can be traced back at least to the 
Marshall Court. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819) 
("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, 
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional."), United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch.) 358, 396 (1805) ("Congress must possess the choice of means, and must 
be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a 
power granted by the constitution."), and L. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law, § 5-3, 300-05 (1987) 
35Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) 
11 § 1. Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny and Its Problems. 
the claimant's religious exercises, the Court t.70Tld then adopt a \·'orklog 
assumption that exempting the religious objector fr8m the challenged legisla­
tion would constitute an acceptable. least-restrictive means to se~ure the 
le p.l·slatl've gnal.36 T0 t tl Ie rtf granlngt' f ree .. preven. _rom exerCIse~our a 
exemption, government had to dRmonstrate that there was some lmportant reason. 
qualifying as a compelling state interest, for denying the exemption and 
Dermitting government to interfere with the religious practices. Justice 
Brennan explained this compelling-interest requirement in 1963, when the Court 
first applied strict scrutiny in the free exercise field. To justify the 
r--'''-. 
infringement of free exercise ~ShOWing merely of a rational relationship to 
some colorable state interest would suffice. ,,37 Instead, '" [o]nly the 
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible 
limitation!" of the free exercise of religion. 38 In other words, government 
had to show not only that the goal of its challenged legislative provision was 
"paramount" but also that permitting the religious practices which the 
provision infringed would pose some "grave" threat to government's ability to 
achieve its goal. Even if government could meet this test and justify some 
interference with the objector's religious practices, it would still have to 
show that it had chosen the legislative means which, next to a complete 
religious exemption, were the least restrictive of religious exercise and 
still achieved the legislative goal. 39 Strict scrutiny in the free exercise 
36Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961) (considering religious 
exemption as a less restrictive means) 
37Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) 
38 Id . (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [1945]) 
39 Id . at 407 
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field represented an intricate fusion of the least-restrictive-mean~ and 
compelling-interest standards. 
At least on paper, strict scrutiny looked like a powerfuliudicial 
doctrine. But its inherent power was troublesome for the Court. Strict 
scrutiny sometimes led the Court to overstate the negative potential of 
40religious exemptions to avoid granting them in particular cases. These 
loose applications of the doctrine threatened to undermine strict scrutiny 
itself by setting a practical standard that was less rigorous than the 
theoretical rules embodied in the doctrine. The reasons for these loose 
applications seemed grounded in four major problems with strict scrutiny in 
the free exercise field. 
First, religious exemptions, like those constitutionally mandated under 
strict scrutiny, might contravene the establishment clause. The Court had 
also interpreted the establishment clause broadly, so that the government had 
to have a secular purpose for all its legislation and had to remain religious­
ly neutral, never favoring religion over non-reI ion. 41 This establishment 
clause interpretation might seem to harmonize quite well with the free 
exercise clause since both doctrines would require the government to demon­
strate a secular purpose and non-discrimination. However, the addition to 
free exercise jurisprudence of an exemption doctrine created a possibility 
that the religion clauses might sometimes contradict one another. For 
instance, some justices suggested that free exercise exemptions which the 
Court could order under strict scrutiny, would violate the establishment 
40 See , e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) 
41 See , e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), School District v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 
(1947) 
§ 1. Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny and Its Problems. 11 
. .. I d b l" ~)clause were they sImp y enacte y a eglslatlve hody. - The justices noted 
that the legislative body might have difficulty demonstrating a secular 
,justification for the exemptions. The legislative exemptions might also 
either favor the exempted religion over other religions or favor religion Ln 
general over non-religion. Consequently, the Court would have to strike down 
on establishment grounds legislative exemptions similar to those the Court 
might mandate on free exercise grounds. 43 
Second, the Court reviewed several cases in which it could not honestly 
find a compelling state interest but also recognized that religious exemptions 
would be undesirable. Requiring a compelling interest seemed fine in theory, 
but in some of the Court's cases an exemption might have created serious 
administrative problems or might have significantly have limited governmental 
discretion over its own operations. 44 But administrative convenience had 
generally not been deemed sufficiently compelling to justify infringements of 
liberty. 
Third, not inconsistent with the warnings of some anti-exemption judges 
and legal scholars, the broad religious diversity within the United States did 
42 See , e.g, Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 725 and 726 (1981) 
(Rehnquist, J. t dissenting) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414-417 
(1963) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
43Establishment and free exercise doctrines, both taken to their logical 
extremes (and there was no theoretical reason not to do so), would create 
complete rigidity in the first amendment. The only constitutionally valid 
religious exemptions would be those which the free exercise clause required. 
Legislative bodies would be powerless to accommodate religious exercise beyond 
the mandates of the free exercise clause. This could lead to unacceptable 
results. For instance, if the free exercise clause did not require military 
draft exemptions (because of an obviously compelling interest). the establish­
ment clause (it doctrines taken to the logical extreme) might preclude 
Congress from legislatively enacting them. 
44See , e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 
U.S. 660 (1988) (upholding forest service administrative decision to build 
road through portion of national forest deemed sacred by Native Americans) and 
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) 
§ 1. Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny and [ts Probl~ms. 
prove a dis-incentive upon 1. ilwral :',[(lnts nf reI igiollS eXf':T.ptioIlS. in '-:H~\/'!:ll
-
cases, the Court did not simplY consider whether or nl)t the religious adher­
cnts at .issue should rece!\'e an exemption. rnstead, the Court ccmtempJa:ed 
the domino effect that might result tram grantJng an exemptlon fO the members 
of the sect befoft>. them. 45 When the Court feared a flood of similar f'lalmS, 
it was reluctant to grant the exemption in the case at hand. 
Moreover, the Court also feared that some of the claims in this poten­
tial flood of litigation would be fraudulent. 46 A great deal of subjective 
~ judging in the religion field rendered strict scrutiny susceptible to abuse . 
...­
People might seek to dodge compliance with laws they merely disliked by 
alleging infringements of bogus religions whose tenets happened to correspond 
to the provisions of the laws that the "religious adherents" disliked. 
Because the Court had no set constitutional definition for "religion," it 
referred to some very general standards in making basically ad hoc, case-bv­
case decisions as to whether a claimant's alleged non-traditional religion 
merited constitutional protection. The Court also had ruled that it would not 
determine the truth or falsity of an individual's professed religion, onlv the 
sincerity with which the adherent held his religious beliefs. 47 These t~o 
inherent limitations on the Court's judicial power in the religion field 
created a real danger that strict scrutiny might require the Court to exempt 
from governmental policies individuals whose fraudulent claims the Court might 
be unable to reject. 
45 See , e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) and Gillette v. 
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) 
46 See , e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) and Gillette v. United 
States, 401 u.S. 437 (1971) 
47See [mited States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) 
~ 1. f'n~e Exerci se Strict Scrutiny and r ts ProbJ.ems. 1 S 
l'he C0 u r t .f aced at 1e c. S tome 0 f t h p 'S P 0 lJ 1ems ',"; i t h s t r iJ'~: s c r ' 1tin \ ' i n 
man',' of the free exercjse (~ases it reViev.led after adopting the doctrine in 
Sherbert. ~indful of these potential difficuJ ties, it exer<;ised i~reat 
caution, and, consequently, j ts free exercise tracK record was l:ot aSlnti.­
goverrmlent under strict scrutiny as a mere reading at the doctrine's criteria 
might suggest that it would be. ,/~ 
But "hile doctrinal difficulties migGustifY an aL teration of 
strict scrutiny, they are inadequate to explain the wholesale abandonment of 
the doctrine in 1990. In fact, they probably were not even the most signifi­
cant reason for the eventual demise of strict scrutiny. More telling were the 
changes among the Court's members. At the same time the Court was cautiously 
recognizing problems with strict scrutiny, it was becoming more conservative 
and less supportive of an activist defense of religious liberty. The composi­
tion of the Court obviously changed between Sherbert in 1963 and Smith I~8 
in 1990, and several key replacements helped to alter its mood toward free 
exercise protection. 49 More importantly, conversions of several justices 
from a pro-exemptions to an anti-exemptions position were also critical to the 
death of free exercise strict scrutiny.50 
The combination of these factors led to the radical shift in Smith II. 
Throughout the 1980's, opposition to free exercise strict scrutiny grew as its 
flaws became increasingly apparent and the Court grew more conservative. 
48110 S.Ct. 1595 
49For instance, Reagan's replacement of Chief Justice Burger with Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in 1986, providing an open slot for the appointment of 
Justice Scalia, resulted in a net loss of a free exercise moderate and a net 
gain of a no-exemptions vote. 
50Several justices, including Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, though 
once endorsing free exercise strict scrutiny, converted to a no-exemptions 
position. 
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Finailv, in Smith.11 tht~ di<-;:.;,(>n:-ir;g mi'lnrirv tH>cafl~e a cant I1jng orit\, 
and the strict scrutiny doctri:w c[;.d,ed tmder preSSllre l-hich ha;.t mounted for 
a decade. Justice ScaLia, l.v"riting fnr a fLve-man majority in Smith II, 
announced that the Court wouid no longer apply strict scrutiny ill virtuallv 
:mv free e\erc i se case.:;. 
But the new majority did not attempt to fashion a new doctrine which 
would correct some of the problems of the old one yet still provide signifi­
cant free exercise protection. Scalia simply deleted the least-restrictive­
means and compelling-interest requirements and virtually abandoned the policy 
of exempting religious objectors. Stripped of these standards, free exercise 
jurisprudence retained only the secular-purpose and general-applicability 
rules. As a result, the Court would uphold governmental interferences with 
religious practices unless the legislation was not generally applicable or its 
purpose was not secular. Since governmental bodies, at least in recent 
history, had almost never practiced this type of blatant religious discrimi­
nation, the practical effect of Smith II was the elimination of free exercise 
as a meaningful right. The new test so restricted the scope of the free 
exercise clause that were it deleted from the Constitution entirely~ what 
little meaning it retained after Smith II would arguably be covered by other 
constitutional provisions. 51 Free exercise retained virtually no indepen­
dent meaning. 
51Justice O'Connor warned in 1986 that the establishment of such a 
limited free exercise approach would "relegate[] a serious First Amendment 
value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause 
[of the fourteenth amendment] already provides." Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 
727 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). In fact, to guard 
against non-secular legislative purposes and to protect religious beliefs as 
well as conduct, the Court would probably have to rely on the establishment 
clause and the freedoms of speech and press in addition to the equal protec­
tion clause. 
17 
§ 2. THE ORIGINS OF FREE EXERCISE STRICT SCRUTINY. 
When the Court introduced strict scrutiny into free exercise jurispru­
dence in Sherbert (1963), it was not dealing with a new concept. Justice 
Stone had explained the philosophical justifications for such a protective 
standard as early as 1938,52 and the Court had adopted the doctrine in equal 
protection jurisprudence nearly twenty years before Sherbert. 53 Dissenting 
justices in free exercise cases prior to 1963 had urged the Court to apply 
this approach in the field of religious liberty,54 and from the earliest 
free exercise cases the Court had faced the question of religious exemp­
tions. 55 Thus, the Sherbert Court was not working in a constitutional 
vacuum. 
In the Court's first significant free exercise decision it soundly 
rejected any notion that the free exercise clause mandated religious exemp­
tions from otherwise valid laws. In Reynolds v. United States (1879),56 the 
Court held that a federal law prohibiting polygamy in the territories did not 
violate the free exercise rights of Mormons. Writing for a unanimous Court, 
52See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 
53 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
54 See , e.g, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 603 
(1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) 
55 See , e.g, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) 
5698 u. S. 145 
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Chief Justice Waite determined that polygamy vas not a protected form of 
religious conduct and condemned the idea of mandatory exemptions. 57 The 
Court reaffirmed this categorical opposition to religious exemptions eleven 
years later in Davis v. Beason. 58 In fact, the unanimous Court rejection of 
religious exemptions continued well into the New Deal era. As late as 1934, 
for instance, Justice Cardozo warned of the potential dangers resulting from 
religious exemptions, noting that tt[tJhe right of private judgment has never 
yet been so exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of 
government. ,,59 
Then came the judicial revolution of 1937, emphasizing the necessity for 
the Court to presume the validity of governmental policies, particularly New 
Deal economic regulations, until proven unconstitutional. However, in United 
States v. Carolene Products (1938),60 Justice Stone remarked in passing in 
his famous footnote number four of the potential need for an exception to this 
policy of judicial restraint. 61 He suggested three occasions when the Court 
57 Id . at 166-67 ("Can a man excuse his [illegal] practices ... because 
of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed 
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect 
to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist 
only in name under such circumstances. lt ) 
58 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (upholding territorial law denying suffrage to 
those who belonged to any organization advocating polygamy as a religious 
tenet) 
59Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 268 
(concurring opinion) (upholding university requirement of participation by 
male students in military science and tactics course) 
60 304 u.s. 144 (upholding federal regulation against interstate commerce 
and fifth amendment challenge) 
61 He wrote: 
"There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of consti­
tutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, 
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Four­
teenth. . . . 
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might shift to the government the burden of proving a statue's validity: (1) 
when the statute appeared on its face to violate the text of the Constitution, 
(2) when the statute restricted democratic processes, and (3) when the statute 
was directed against religious and other minority groups. From the theoreti­
cal foundation of this footnote eventually grew the strict scrutiny approach 
in both the equal protection and later the free exercise fields. In fact, 
early versions of the least-restrictive-means and compelling-interest stan­
dards appeared disparately in two free exercise cases in 1940,62 but they 
did not fuse into a uniform doctrine in any single free exercise case. 
A loose form of the least-restrictive-means standard did appear in 
Cantwell v. Connecticut63 . In Cantwell three Jehovah's Witnesses challenged 
their convictions under a state law conditioning their right to solicit on a 
prior governmental conclusion that their religious cause was legitimate. 
Invalidating the statute as a censorship of religion and a prior restraint 
upon its free exercise, Justice Roberts stated for a unanimous Court that 
legislation must be "general and non-discriminatory,,64 to pass free exercise 
scrutiny, But he also asserted that "the power to regulate must be so 
"It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts 
those political processes [like voting] which can ordinarily be expected to 
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more 
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
[a]mendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . 
"Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious .•. , or national ... , 
or racial minorities ... : whether prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.... Id. at 152, n. 4ft 
62Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 and Minersville School District 
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 
63 310 U.S. 296 (1940) 
64 Id. at 304 
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exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, 11ndulv to infringe the 
protected freedom. ,,65 While this criticism of "undue" infringements might 
not require the government to apply the means least restrictive of religious 
liberty, he was certainly moving the Court in that direction. 
In the second case of 1940, Minersville School District ~r. Gobitis,66 
the Court hinted at a type of compelling-interest requirement. In this case 
the Court refused to exempt from mandatory flag salutes in public school two 
Jehovah's Witness children who believed that their religion prohibited such 
salutes. Justice Frankfurter, writing for a seven-person majority, seemed at 
first glance to apply only the secular-purpose and general-applicability 
standards. 67 But while Frankfurter cited Reynolds, Davis, and some other 
cases to support this free exercise approach, he noted that "[i]n all these 
cases the general laws in question . . . were manifestations of specific 
powers of government deemed by the legislature essential to secure and 
maintain that orderly, tranquil, and free society without which religious 
toleration itself is unattainable.,,68 He seemed to place some weight on his 
conclusion that the government interest at issue in the case (promoting 
national unity) was "inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values.,,69 
Although he did assert that H[tlhe mere possession of religious convictions 
65 Id. 
66310 U.S. 586 
67 Id• at 594 (The Court had never held free exercise to be infringed by 
"legislation of general scope not directed at the doctrinal loyalties of 
particular sects. . . . Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the 
long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience 
to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious 
beliefs.") 
68 Id. 

69 Id . at 595 
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which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve 
the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities",70 Frankfurter 
seemed not to conclude simply that the mandatory flag salute was constitution­
al because it was a secular, general regulation. He had qualified his 
statement by referring to "the relevant concerns of a political society,,,71 
and he stressed that the need to foster national Ilnity was exceedingly 
important. The importance he attached to the governmental interest influenced 
his opinion. Such an influence, though not necessarily a requirement of a 
compelling state interest, foreshadowed such a standard. 
Despite the Court's endorsement in Cantwell of loose form of the least­
restrictive-means criterion, Frankfurter did not apply such a standard in 
Gobitis. Instead, he dodged the criterion, asserting that "the effective 
means for [attaining national unity] are still so uncertain and so unauthenti­
cated by science as to preclude us from putting the widely prevalent belief in 
flag-saluting beyond the pale of legislative power.,,72 Since the Court 
"possess[ed] no marked and certainly no controlling competence,,73 in educa­
tional matters, it should not make itself "the school board for the coun­
try.,,74 The Court's willingness to require a narrowly tailored policy in 
CantJ-lell was missing in Gobitis, suggesting perhaps that such willingness 
depended on either the Court's self-perceived competence in any particular 
field or upon its view of the result it hoped to achieve in any particular 
case. At any rate, Cantwell contained a sort of least-restrictive-means 
70 Id. at 594-95 

71 Id. (emphasis added) 

72 Id . at 598 

73 Id. at 597-98 

74 Id . at 598 
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standard but no requirement of a compelling interest, and in Gobitis the 
reverse was true. But neither of the cases of 1940 can be said to have 
completely endorsed a full strict scrutiny approach for free exercise claims. 
Stone, however, relied on his footnote in Carolene Products to outline 
iust such a doctrine in his dissenting opinion in Gobitis. He argued that the 
Court should hold a governmental policy unconstitutional, despite its general 
applicability and secular purpose, if "there were ways enough to secure the 
legitimate state end without infringing the asserted immunity" or if "the 
inconvenience caused by the inability to secure that end satisfactorily 
through other means, did not outweigh freedom of ... religion.,,7S The 
former of his rules implied a least-restrictive-means requirement and the 
latter suggested a standard of heightened importance along the lines of a 
compelling interest. But Stone's Gobitis dissent would have to wait twenty­
three years before winning majority status in Sherbert. 
Subsequent history soon justified Stone's strong support of religious 
liberty and his opposition to the Gobitis judgment. That decision endured for 
only three years. Gobitis immediately fueled a pre-existing nationwide 
movement against the Jehovah's Witnesses. 76 Compulsory flag salutes spread 
across the country and were Ucosting Witness children their right to public 
education in at least thirty-one states.,,77 Perhaps as a result,78 Jus­
tices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, who had joined Frankfurter's Gobitis 
opinion, switched sides in 1942 and declared in a dissenting opinion in Jones 
7S Id. at 603 (dissenting opinion) 

76n. Manwaring, Render Unto Caesar: The Flag-Salute Controversy 163-92 

(1962) 
77 Id . at 187 
78 Id• at 206-07 
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\'. Opelika79 their belief that Gobitis had been wrongly decided. Roosevelt 
also replaced two other members of the Court between 1940 and 1942, elevating 
80Stone to the Chief Justiceship in the process. But even with conversions 
and replacements. Stone's position remained a minority view, five-to-four. 81 
As a result the Court split five-to-four in Jones and upheld the 
application to Jehovah's Witnesses of several local ordinances providing for 
flat-rate licensing taxes for itinerant merchants. Justice Reed, writing for 
the majority. assumed that the door-to-door religious solicitation of the 
Witnesses was commercial activity. He also argued that the generally applica­
ble tax was more like a neutral time, place, or manner regulation of solicita­
tion than a censorship or prohibition of religious exercise. He found the tax 
constitutional. 
In dissent Stone and Murphy, joined by Black and Douglas, each contended 
that the tax was not a simple time, place, or manner regulation because it did 
not regulate anything. Nor was it a fee to offset the cost of the licensing 
system. For them, it was simply a revenue-generating measure, and as such was 
unconstitutional. They argued that the government could not place a general, 
revenue-generating tax on the exercise of a first amendment right, like the 
free exercise of religion. But the minority would have to await either 
another conversion by a member of the majority or a replacement on the Court 
before attaining majority status. 
79Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (opinion of Black, J.) 
80ln 1941, Roosevelt replaced Justice McReynolds with Justice Byrnes, 
and he appointed Justice Jackson to fill Stone's seat when he elevated the 
latter to replace Chief Justice Hughes. See H. Abraham, The Judicial Process, 
398-403 (1986). Byrnes and Jackson joined with Frankfurter on free exercise 
matters. See Jones, 316 U.S. 584. 
81Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, Byrnes, and Jackson, JJ., opposed Stone's 
broader reading of the free exercise clause while Black, Douglas, and Murphy, 
JJ., supported it. See Jones, 316 U.S. 584. 
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They did not have to wait very long. Justice Byrnes, appointed only tn 
1941, resigned at the start of the fall 1942 Term. 82 Roosevelt appointed 
D.C. Appeals Court Judge Wiley Rutledge83 to fill Byrnes' vacant seat. 
There was little doubt about how Rutledge would have ruled in Jones; in 
Murphy's dissent in that 	case he had approvingly cited a dissenting opinion of 
84Rutledge in similar case. In fact, the Court granted the challengers in 
Jones a rehearing, and by February, 1943, the minority had become a five­
person majority. 
Before the end of that Term, the Court had vacated its previous judgment 
and re-decided Jones per curiam. In a case presenting the same issues, the 
Court explained its rationale and reaffirmed Cantwell's least-restrictive­
means requirement. In this case, Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943),85 the 
Court struck down a flat-rate licensing tax similar to the one at issue in 
Jones. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, asserted that for ,Jehovah's 
Witnesses itinerant solicitation was more a religious activity than a commer­
cial one. And he explained that because the "power to tax the exercise of a 
privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment ... [, a1 state 
may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the federal 
constitution. ,,86 Finally, Douglas answered Reed's contention that the tax 
was valid because it was simply a neutral regulatory device. Douglas asserted 
that the tax would not be valid even if did purport to regulate something 
because it was not Ttnarrowly drawn to prevent or control abuses or evils 
82H. Abraham, The Judicial Process, 400 (1986) 

83 Id . at 400 

84Jones, supra, n. _, at 614, n. 4 

85 319 U.S. 105 

86 Id • at 112-13 
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arising from [door-to-door solicitation]. Rather, it sets aside the residen­
tial areas as a prohibited zone, entry of which is denied [the Witnesses] 
unless the tax is paid. '187 The indiscriminate nature of the tax rendered it 
unconstitutional: "A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional 
validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment 
along with the wares of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike.,,8B 
Douglas seemed to adopt a least-restrictive-means requirement, the Cantwell 
standard that Frankfurter had refused to apply in Gobitis. 
But the new majority was not content with that implicit repudiation of 
Gobitis. They explicitly overruled it in another case that term, West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943).89 This case presented 
the same situation the Court faced in Gobitis: Jehovah's Witness children 
sought free exercise exemptions from mandatory flag salutes in public school. 
Although the Court did overrule Gobitis, it did not decide Barnette on free 
exercise grounds and did not grant the children religious exemptions from the 
flag salutes. As a result, the Court's opinion in Barnette contributed only 
brief dicta to the development of free exercise doctrine. 
Instead of deciding the case on free exercise grounds, the Court struck 
down mandatory flag salutes as a violation of the freedom of speech, conclud­
ing that the government could not compel any student, regardless of religious 
beliefs, to participate in these patriotic ceremonies. There were probably 
two reasons for this approach. First, Gobitis was only a three-year-old 
precedent, so overruling it would make the Court look suspiciously inconsis­
87 Id . at 117 
88 Id . at 115 
89319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down mandatory flag salutes in public 
schools) 
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tent. As a result~ the majority may not have wanted to overturn Gobitis, 
which was decided by an eight-to-one margin, with the narrow five-to-four 
split of Murdock. Switching the decision to free speech grounds persuaded 
Justice Jackson, who had dissented in Murdock, to change sides. Perhaps not 
coincidentally~ Jackson was assigned to write the opinion of the Court in 
Barnette. By taking the free speech approach, the majority was also able to 
exploit a point which Frankfurter's opinion in Gobitis had not carefully 
evaluated. Jackson explained in Barnette that Frankfurter had assumed "that 
power exists in the State to impose the flag salute upon school children in 
general" and then decided the religious question,90 But in Barnette the 
Court decided that general power to require the salutes was forbidden by free 
speech, so there was no need to consider the question of religious exemptions 
from the unconstitutional mandatory flag salute. 
Despite the Court's free speech basis for its decision in Barnette, 
Jackson sufficiently commented upon Frankfurter's reasoning in Gobitis to 
reveal that the new majority rejected his assertion that the Court should 
defer to the judgment of school boards because it lacked special competence in 
educational matters. Jackson first noted that school boards as well as 
Congress were bound by the Constitution, which it was the Court's duty to 
enforce. He then went on to refute Frankfurter further, asserting: 
Nor does our duty to apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of 
official authority depend upon our possession of marked competence 
in the field where the invasion of rights occurs. . . . We 
cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such 
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that 
90 Id . at 635 
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history authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty 
is infringed. 91 
To the extent that Frankfurter's deference on this point undermined an 
application of the least-restrictive-means standard in Gobitis, the new 
majority might be assumed to have supported that requirement in free exercise 
cases. But Jackson, who had mocked Douglas' application of that standard in 
Murdock,92 did not invoke any "narrow tailoring" language in Barnette. 
Jackson did imply in dicta the need for a version of a compelling-
interest standard in free exercise jurisprudence. He argued that legitimate 
governmental regulation of certain issues included "power to impose all of the 
restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for 
adopting. ,,93 But this broad power did not extend into the first amendment 
arena: "[F]reedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may 
not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction 
only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the state may 
lawfully protect.,,94 This passage represented the toughest statement in 
support of a standard like compelling-interest in the free exercise field that 
a Court majority had espoused up to that time. But, once again, neither 
Barnette nor Murdock explicitly combined both the least-restrictive-means and 
compelling-interest standards in one opinion as a comprehensive free exercise 
doctrine leading to the judicial granting of religious exemptions. That 
91 Id . at 639 
92Murdock, supra, n. ,at 178 (dissenting opinion) ("If the local 
authorities must draw closer aim at evils than they did in these cases I doubt 
that they ever can hit them.") 
93 Id . at 639 
94 Id . (emphasis added) 
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r'esult \.{ould not occur until the Court explicitly introduced strict scrutin\' 
into the free exercise field twenty years ater. 
Frankfurter, no doubt sensing that eventual result, filed a lengthy 
dissent addressing several issues related to strict scrutiny for free exercise 
claims and grants of reI ious exemptions from laws. He provided perhaps the 
most thoughtful and detailed statement of the position opposing strict 
scrutiny and free exercise exemptions that any justice has ever delivered. 
First, he objected to a system of review whereby challenges under one provi­
sion of the Constitution would be scrutinized more carefully than challenges 
under another. He wrote of the requirements of judicial restraint: 
There is no warrant in the constitutional basis of this Court's 
authority for attributing different roles to it depending upon the 
nature of the challenge to the legislation. Our power does not 
vary according to the particular provision of the Bill of Rights 
which is invoked. The right not to have property taken without 
just compensation has . . . the same constitutional dignity as the 
freedom of speech or religious freedom. 95 
Frankfurter would not even admit a hierarchy of levels of scrutiny between 
purely economic challenges, once used by the Court to invalidate much of the 
New Deal, and first amendment freedoms. 
In addition, he objected to the whole notion of Court-ordered exemptions 
from laws. The framers, he believed, had never intended the Court to partici­
pate in the legislative process. "It is ... beyond our power to rewrite the 
state's requirement, by providing exemptions. . . . That wisdom might suggest 
the making of such accommodations ... is outside our province to suggest. 
A court can only strike down. . •. It cannot make exceptions to a 
95 Id . at 648 (dissenting opinion) 
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. 1196general requlrement.· . He also argued that thp framers never intended to 
exempt religious adherents from any law to Hhich they objected. liThe consti­
tutional protection of religious freedom terminated disabiljties, it did not 
c reateneW' p r i viI ~ g e s . I t g avere1 i 0 use '1 uali t y , (' i v i 1 i mmlln i tv. I1 s 
essence is freedom from conformity to rei iOlls dogma, nnt frr>ec!oill from 
conformity to law because of re] ious dogma.,,97 Frankfurter went on to 
assert that if religious liberty meant religiol1s adherents could object to 
generall v applicable, secular requirements, then "instead of separation of 
church and state, there would be the subordination of the state on any matter 
deemed within the sovereignty of the religious conscience. . . . The validity 
of secular laws cannot be measured by their conformity to religious doc­
trines.,!98 Finally, Frankfurter noted that a doctrine of exemptions could 
not work in a religiously pluralistic society. In short, he chastised the 
majority for simply reading into the Constitution their personal views Ilf the 
wisdom of the mandatory flag salute. 
One year after Barnette, the Court had another opportunity to formally 
adopt strict scrutiny in the free exercise field but did not clearly do so. 
In Pr.ince v. Massachusetts,99 a Jehovah's Witness, Sarah Prince, challenged 
her conviction under a child labor law. She had permitted her under-age niece 
(and ward), Betty, to accompany her in street solicitation activities. Prince 
argued that the law violated her right to instill her religion in Betty~ and 
that it violated Betty's right to exercise that religion. She asked the Court 
to apply a strict scrutiny approach in evaluating her claim. 
96 Id. at 651 

97 Id . at 653 

98 Id . at 654 

99321 u.S. 158 
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But the Court deelined t.) D.pplv ':1t:rl:'t S 'rutin\' and :lpheJd Priw'e's 
(':onv i.c t ion on the grounds t ha t t he doc t r i ne (\ f parens p/l t r j <1(-' ga\!e gove rnment 
gr::iiter pO\..J~r to restrict the acti\ities of mi~lOrs ihan those of adults. 
Justic(' Rutledge, wr ting for the Court, asserted that 
rtlhe state's authority over children's activities is broader than 
over 1 ike actions of adults. A democratic society rests, 
for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of 
voung people into full maturity as citizens, with all that lm­
plies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers 
in a broad range of selection. 100 
The Court was not willing to demand government to apply the least-restrictive 
means when the legislative end related to the protection of children. As 
Justice Jackson noted in dissent, the Court had "draw[nl a line based on 
age.,,101 Rutledge did note that if the same statute had been applied to 
adults, it would be unconstitutional. This remark might be taken as an 
implicit endorsement of strict scrutiny in cases not involving children. But 
Justice Murphy, who in dissent cited both the Carolene Products footnote and 
Barnette's "grave and immediate danger" dicta, was the only member of the 
Court to expressly sanction free exercise strict scrutiny. 
The Court did not have another real chance to invoke strict scrutiny in 
the free exercise field until the early 1960's. Chief Justice Stone died two 
years after Prince. Truman's appointment of the more conservative Chief 
Justice Vinson to replace him probably returned Stone's free exercise majority 
to minority status and precluded any radical alteration of free exercise 
100 Id . at 168 (emphasis added) 

101 Id . at 178 
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doctrine. '10')- Bv 1949. T:'uman had repLacer! t:wo more members of Stone's f~e 
exercise group, Justices Murphv and RutJedge, with more conser"ativejustic 
103es. This Court did not retreat and nverturn Nurdoc.k or Barnettp, but Lt: 
did not measurabLy extend free exercise doctrine either. 
About the (~losest the Vinson CClIlrt came to ~u('h "itl e'\:tf~ns Lnn \·.rtS 
Niemotko v. Nar.-vland,104 decided in 1951. In that case, the Court over­
turned the convictions of two Jehovah's Witnesses for disorderly conduct. The 
Witnesses had sought to hold religious meetings in a city park, but the Park 
Commissioner and city council denied their request. Although the itv hall no 
permit ordinance, it had traditionally operated under a permit system. The 
Witnesses held their meetings anyway, and their leaders were arrested. 
Al though the Court discussed the lack of "narrowly dra\-ln limitations" or any 
Hsuhstantial interest of the community,,,105 it based its decision on the 
equal protection clause, not free exercise. Moreover, the Court based its 
opinion in a similar case decided at the same time on free speech rather than 
free exercise grounds. 106 
During the subsequent decade, the Court did not decide any free exercise 
cases relevant to the development of strict scrutiny in that field. As of the 
late 1950's, it was clear that the free exercise clause demanded that govern­
mental policies infringing religious exercises be generally applicable and 
have a secular aim. The Court had also created two disparate lines of cases 
endorsing tougher free exercise standards. One line, consisting of Cantwell 
102H• Abraham, The Judicial Process, 400 (1986) 

103 Id . at 400-01 

104340 U.S. 268 

105 Id. at 272 

106Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 
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and Hl1rc/ock, required the government to narrcHdv tailor its poLicies so as to 
minimize interference with reI Ions exercise. Thjs principle approximated a 
least-restrictive-means standard. At the same time, Gobitis and Barnette 
suggested that the government had to demonstrate some important interest to 
justi its infringements of n~ligious 1 iberty. And Prince tacitl,· endorsed a 
combination of the two Jines. Apart from dissenting opinions, the Court never 
explicitly integrated the two rules into a comprehensive strict scrutiny 
doctrine in the free exercise field. 
And in the first free exercise case of the 1960's, Bral1nfeld v. 
Brown,107 the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny. In this case, the 
Court heard the challenge of an Orthodox Jewish merchant to PennsYlvania's 
Sundav Closing Law. 108 Abraham Braunfeld, already required bv his religion 
to close his business on Friday night and Saturday, claimed that the state's 
requirement that he also close on Sunday threatened his ability to stay in 
business. As a result, Braunfeld argued, the state had violated his right to 
free exercise by forcing him to choose between his religious exercise and his 
business. Although a majority of justices could not agree on a rationale, the 
Court ruled, seven-to-two, that the interference was justified. 
Chief Justice Warren announced the Court's judgment and filed a plural i­
ty op inion for himself and three other justices. He reaff irmed Cantwe.ll! 5 
least-restrictive-means standard but did not require Pennsylvania to demon­
strate a compelling interest. Instead, he introduced a new distinction into 
107366 U.S. 599 (1961) 
108At the same time, other litigants challenged this and other laws as 
violations of the establishment clause and equal protection of the laws. The 
Court, however, upheld the Sunday Closing Law against both of these challeng­
es. McGowan v. Maryland t 366 U.S. 420 (1961), Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super 
Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961)t and Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. 
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) 
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free exercise jurisprudenc2. "'];HT~~n djstins~uisned Ih:~tT.e"'n :-;ta utes rhat 
burdened free exercise directlv t om those \vhicf1 hurdened it onlv indirectly. 
A direct hurden referred to a ~ovprnment~ polic v that uhsolutelv prohihited 
S(lme relir,ious conduct while an indirec burden reff'rrerl to 0')(:: ha~ only 
p ! a (' eli dis - neE' n t t \ e s [) n t ~l e p r a (' tic e (; f s ()meac t i v i t v ( e q u j red b v a {' haL 
lenger's religion. The Sundav Closing Law at issue did not mandate. that: 
Braunfeld open his business on his Sabbath, it only placed a dis-incentive 
up 0 n his c hoi c e toe los e . As ares ul t, iton1v i nd irec t 1 y bu [(1e ned hi s 
eli gin U 5 prac t ices. Accord i ng to War ren, the Cour t woul d app 1y th('~ Can tt,'e 11 
standard to governmental policies that burdened religious exercise onlv 
indirectly. It would not require government to also demonstrate a compelling 
interest to justify the indirect interference. It is important to note that 
Warren did not precisely e~plain what approach the Court would take when a 
policy burdened free exercise directly. He noted only that such instances 
required the "particularly delicate task" of making an "accommodation betltv'een 
the reI ious action and the exercise of state authority.,,109 It was not 
clear whether or not he believed the Court should apply strict scrutiny in 
cases of direct burdens. 
But Warren clearly outlined the Court's method of analysis in cases of 
indirect burdens. He obviously invoked the secular-purpose and general-
applicability standards: "If the purpose or effect of a law is to impedf~ the 
observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously bet~een 
religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be 
characterized as being only indirect.,,110 Then Warren embraced the least­
restrictive-means requirement when challenged legislation met these initial 
109Braunfeld, supra, n. _, a t 605 

110 Id . at 607 
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a burden. 
sta.ndards: It! l]f the St re reg 
its pOher, the purpose and effect qf h is tl) advance the State's secular 
gOils. t.he statue is vaLid rlec.;pitf' jts indirect burden on TPl1 inns observance 
lInless' thp State mav acrompiih'h it'> purpnse lFV mea,ns J-,ohi(11 (fr, not Impoc;e s'u('h 
Thus, \.-Jarr too k Ca n t r.,..- L 1 and C;:t ref 1., L­
]v restated its requirements, adopting them as the frre exercise test for 
policies which indirectly burdened religiously motivated activities. 
Rut he helct .. unlike the Cantvel1 Court, that the challenged law met 
these standards, so he reiected Braunfeld's claim. Warren cited one of the 
other Sunday Closing cases decided on the same day, McGowan v. iVaryland,112 
as support for the proposition that Sunday Closing Laws, though once reli­
giously based, had evolved into generally applicable, secular regulations. 
And although Warren accepted Braunfeld's suggestion that a religious exemption 
might be a less restrictive means for some of the state's s, he did not 
grant the exemption. Warren argued that the state's primary goal was to 
provide one commercial-free day to all its citizens and that exemptions, 
though less restrictive, would undermine the purpose of the statute. Forcing 
Braunfeld to comply with the Sunday Closing Law was therefore essential to 
achieve the legislative end. He also noted other problems that religious 
exemptions might create. But Warren did not apply the Barnette dicta and 
inquire about the importance of the legislative end itself. A compelling-
interest showing was not part of the plurality's test. 
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Stewart, asserted that 
the Court should have required Pennsylvania to justify its infringement with a 
compelling interest. Brennan first quoted Jackson's Barnette dicta which 
111 Id . (emphasis added) 

112See supra, n. 
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S11;~gf'sted that government could int ir::,e r,-'Li ous lihertv "'nnl',' tu PI' 
11) 
i }grave ;:Jnel immediate danger!" to state : n +. ') r " ,.. t s' i. J L '"' . ..., <,' " 
Stnne's L'arolene Proriucts footnote 10 support fllS rositinn. ::~r('nqc:ln ass2rt,'cl 
that thf'se :wrl other precedents shm·;ed (hat the {'flurt had to dppl v '.:;tr 
scrurlnv in t=,valuat:ini: tree e\ercise (·laLms. and he- did so if! his oFLnion. He 
sllf,gested that Pennsylvania couLd pr'ovide rel igious exemptions dnd still 
achieve a of requiring each person to rest one day a week. Sabbatar ans 
would simply rest on Saturday and opt Lo work on Sunday while everyone else 
rested on Sunday and remained free to \-70rk on Saturday. Brennan noted that a 
number of states applied this scheme without tremendous problems. Given this 
alternative, he could not conclude that the state's additional interest in 
providing a day of rest that was uniform was sufficiently compelling to 
jllstify the infringement of Braunfeld's religious exercise. That the burden 
on Braunfeld's religious practice was only indirect was irrelevant for 
Brerlnan. He argued that in the case of either a direct or an indirect burden, 
the free exercise clause required the Court to apply a compelling-interest 
standard in addition to the least-restrictive-means requirement that the 
plurality endorsed. Since Brennan concluded that religious exemptions would 
not present any "grave and immediate danger" to the state's interest in 
providing that everyone take a day off, and since the state's additional 
interest in enforcing uniformity was not compelling, Brennan and Stewart 
dissented. 
Frankfurter filed an additional opinion concurring in the result. In 
this opinion, which justice Harlan joined, he outlined his own approach to 
free exercise claims: 
113Braunfeld, supra, n._t at 612 
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regul a t ion j s demons t:r db J 
the regu 1at ion sub ~ ec t s t h() S i-~ \.; h() " e r (' L1 g i 011 S Pr (lc tic es are 
(,urtailed b\' itt or if the object sought hv the regula! (it! ':'ollld 
with equal effect be achieved b\' alt(>rnativ(~ means hThich do not 
substantially impede those religious practices, the regulatio!l 
. 114cannot be sustaIned. 
frankfurter accepted a least-restricti\'e-means standard, but he qual ified it 
bv requiring that the less-restrictive means would still achieve the legisla­
tive end "with equal effect. " He disapproved of Brennan's approach, whereby 
the Court would grant an exemption since the state would still be able to 
fulfill its general interest in a slightly less effective way. If the state's 
legislative goal was to provide a uniform day of rest, Frankfurter would 
evaluate that goal without reference to a less comprehensive goal that 
achieved almost the same results. To make the evaluation Frankfurter proposed 
a cost-benefit analysis to weigh the relative importance of the legislat~ve 
end in the event that no less-restrictive means were available. He was 
willing to strike down a statute if the burden upon free exercise was greater 
than the benefit gained by achieving the "community interest s !l115 repre­
sented by the statute. Frankfurter relied on arguments identical to Warren's 
to conclude that religious exemptions would not be effective alternative means 
but would frustrate the government's ability to achieve its secular end. 
Going beyond Warren, Frankfurter purported to balance the community benefit of 
114McGowan v. Maryland, supra, n. ,at 462 (Frankfurter, J., concurring 
in judgment) 
115 Id • at 522 
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the statute against the cost: t.11 Ule inrii\ idual, and, not surprisingL\-, he 
found that the community benefits outweigheri the ~ndividual costs. 116 
As a result of the fractured Court in Braunfelrl and the new direct-
indirect distinction of the plurality opinion, free exercise jurisprudr-'>rlce was 
1esc; (' J ear- after Braunfeld than before the case was dpcidert, The inahilitv of 
any position to gain a majority suggested that Braunfeld would not become a 
very important precedent. In fact, within two years after the Court's 
decision in Braunfeld, Justice Goldberg had replaced Frankfurter, and Brennan 
had apparently persuaded Warren and two other members of the plurality to 
accept his free exercise position. When the Court decided Sherbert in 1963, 
it adopted Brennan's approach in Braunfeld as the majority position, seven-to­
two. The opinion in Sherbert, which Brennan wrote, brought the compelling-
interest and least-restrictive-means standards together, establishing strict 
scrutiny in the free exercise field for the first time. 
116Frankfurter did not specifically note how he weighed the individual 
costs of potential eternal damnation or bankruptcy for Braunfeld against the 
community interests of a day of rest. In fact, he seemed merely to downplay 
the individual costs and overstate the benefits. At the same time he warned 
against justices' applying their own personal opinions, a possibility to which 
his cost-benefit analysis seemed to provide an open invitation. 
18 
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Although the Court introduced strict scrutiny into the free exercise 
field in Sherbert (1963),117 it did not definitively establish the doctrine 
in this case. The Court's opinion in Sherbert left some questions regarding 
the proper application of strict scrutiny in the free exercise field. The 
Court gradually clarified its position on free exercise strict scrutiny over 
the subsequent years and fully installed the doctrine by 1981. 118 
In Sherbert, the Court heard the case of Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-Day 
Adventist who lost her job because she refused to work on Saturdays when her 
employer extended the work week of all its employees to six days, South 
Carolina denied her request for unemployment compensation. The state denied 
benefits to unemployed individuals who were not "available for work." Because 
Sherbert was willing to accept work only if it did not require Saturday labor, 
the state decided that she did not meet its employment availability require­
ment. She challenged the denial of unemployment benefits as a violation of 
her right to the free exercise of religion, and the Court agreed, applying 
strict scrutiny to do so. 
Although a Court majority decided to rule in Sherbert's favor, it also 
apparently refused to overturn Braunfeld. This refusal created problems for 
117374 U.S. 398 
118See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.s. 707 (1981), McDaniel v. Paty, 
435 U.s. 618 (1978), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.s. 205 (1971) 
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Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Sherbert. His primarv of 
course was to expressly install strict scrutiny in free exercise jurispru­
dence. But the Court majority constrained his ability to clearly establish 
that doctrine because Brennan also had to attempt to distinguish Braunfeld to 
maintain its validity. On the surface, Brennan's opinion read like a flow 
chart for deciding free exercise cases. But just underneath the surface lay 
contradictions and qualifications that undermined Brennan's goal of establish­
ing strict scrutiny as the primary method of evaluating free exercise claims. 
Brennan first noted that there were some forms of conduct, like polyga­
my, which the free exercise clause did not protect. In those cases, the Court 
would simply uphold any statute that prevented anyone, including a reI ious 
adherent, from performing such conduct as a religious rite or otherwise. 
Sherbert's abstinence from Saturday labor, however, was protected because it 
did not "pose[] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or 
order.,,119 So government could not enact legislation aimed at preventing 
Sherbert from abstaining from Saturday labor. Any infringement of her 
religious practice had to be an incidental effect of a secular regulation, as 
it was in the case at hand. 
Then, Brennan faced a problem. According to Braunfeld, if a generally 
applicable, secular policy indirectly burdened an individual's free exercise, 
it was not valid unless the government could show that it had employed the 
least-restrictive means possible to achieve its legislative end. If no less­
restrictive means were available, however, Braunfeld did not sanction a free 
exercise approach under which the Court could also require the government to 
justify its indirect burden on free exercise by showing that it fulfilled some 
compelling interest. If the burden were direct, the Court might apply a 
119 Id . at 403 
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compelling-interest standard, but Braunfeld was not clear on this point. At 
any rate, although Sherbert presented only an indirect burden, Brennan wanted 
to establish full strict scrutiny, including a compelling-interest standard. 
In order to both sanction free exercise strict scrutiny and also respect 
Braunfeld, Brennan produced a vague opinion which could be read in two ways, 
depending on which passages were emphasized. On one level, he seemed to apply 
a full strict scrutiny approach, as though Braunfeld had never been decided. 
He first had to determine whether or not South Carolina's availability 
requirement, as interpreted by the state, burdened Sherbert's religion. 
Brennan decided that the denial of benefits, an indirect burden similar to the 
one in Braunfeld, did infringe Sherbert's free exercise rights. It forced her 
to choose between adhering to her tenet of faith, foregoing Saturday labor, 
and sacrificing benefits on one hand or violating a tenet of her religion in 
order to receive unemployment benefits. For Brennan, "such a choice puts the 
same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed 
against [Sherbert] for her Saturday worship.,,120 So he concluded that 
South Carolina's disqualification provision, when applied against Sherbert, 
did burden her right to free exercise, if only indirectly. 
Brennan then seemed to completely ignore Braunfeld's distinction between 
direct and indirect burdens, holding that South Carolina had to demonstrate 
that including Sherbert's religiously based abstinence within the meaning of 
the disqualification provision was justified by some compelling interest. 
This consideration would seem to contradict the rule of adjudication estab­
lished in Braunfeld for instances of indirect burdens. At any rate, the state 
argued that protecting its unemployment compensation fund from fraudulent 
claims was compelling. But Brennan announced that the Court would not deter­
120 Id• at 404 
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mine whether or not any compelling interest existed because the state supreme 
court had not considered the question. ~oting that many states provided 
exemptions for Sabbatarians, Brennan did make clear that the Court would not 
accept any asserted governmental interest as compelling. He remanded the case 
to the state court and implied that if that court did not exempt Sherbert from 
the disqualification provision, the Supreme Court would do so on appeal. 
Brennan declined to evaluate the assertion of compelling interest in deference 
to the state court, but his opinion expressly sanctioned the use of strict 
scrutiny in the free exercise field. 
While on this superficial level Brennan's opinion appeared to represent 
a straightforward endorsement of strict scrutiny, it contained inconsistencies 
and qualifications just below the surface. These flaws in his ruling, 
resulting from his attempts to distinguish Braunfeld, rendered the opinion a 
less than clear approval of strict scrutiny. Although Brennan seemed to 
eliminate the distinction between direct and indirect burdens, he noted that 
Braunfeld was still valid because the burden in that case had been less direct 
than the one in Sherbert. But the directness of the burden was irrelevant 
under the test he applied in Sherbert, so he could not legitimately distin­
guish Braunfeld on that ground. And his contradictory statement left some 
question about the potential of continued soundness for the direct-indirect 
distinction in the free exercise field. Although the Court noted that the 
burden in Sherbert was indirect, it applied strict scrutiny to find it 
unconstitutional. But by also claiming that Braunfeld was still a valid 
precedent, the Court left open the possibility that some challenges to 
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indirect burdens might be evaluated according to the less stringent do(·t~ine 
applied in Braunfeld. 121 
Brennan also tried to distinguish Braunfeld in another way: by stretch­
ing the facts in Sherbert to suggest that the disqualification provision was 
not generally applicable but was in fact discriminatory. In Braunfeld. \<Jarrcn 
lad announced a specific test only for instances when some generally applica­
ble and secular governmental policy indirectly burdened religious exercise. 
Warren, it will be recalled, did not clearly articulate standards for cases in 
which the burden was indirect but the legislation was discriminatory or non­
secular. Nor did he outline a precise judicial approach in cases of direct 
burdens on free exercise. Brennan apparently tried to cast the disqualifica­
tion provision in Sherbert as discriminatory so as to avoid applying the 
Braunfeld test that did not include a compelling-interest standard. In fact, 
he quoted as relevant to Sherbert a portion of Braunfeld which suggested that 
discriminatory policies were always invalid, but he ignored the sentence 
immediately following the portion he quoted. That sentence outlined the 
least-restrictive-means approach for generally applicable policies but did not 
endorse a compelling-interest standard. Brennan seemed to be writing his 
Sherbert opinion so that if it were read on a deeper level, and were directly 
compared with Braunfeld, one might conclude that Sherbert defined strict 
scrutiny as the proper judicial approach when cases involved discriminatory or 
121It could be argued that Brennan's dispute with Chief Justice Warren's 
plurality opinion in Braunfeld was based not on the plurality's refusal to 
apply strict scrutiny but on their acceptance of the state's asserted inter­
ests as compelling when Brennan did not believe that they were. But this 
interpretation of the disagreement in Braunfeld does not comport with Warren's 
plurality opinion or with Brennan's urging from dissent that precedent 
required a showing of compelling interest. Given the clarity with which 
Warren outlined the criteria that the Court should apply in cases like 
Braunfeld, it would be a stretch to assume that the majority really used a 
compelling-interest standard but did not explicitly announce that they were 
using it. 
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non-secular legislation that indirectly burdened free exercise. In other 
~ords, Brennan would be filling one of the holes ~hich Warren left open in 
Braunfeld. 
Brennan's suggestion that the disqualifying provision ~as disrriminatorv 
was based on two propositions, neither of which were sound. First, he 
asserted that although the state court had held that Sherbert's religious 
reason for refusing Saturday work disqualified her, the court had not ruled 
out the possibility that it might exclude from the disqualification provision 
other, perhaps non-religious, personal reasons for refusing Saturday work. 
The state's decision to disqualify Sherbert might then constitute religious 
discrimination, and the provision might fail the general-applicability 
requirement. Justice Harlan objected in dissent to Brennan's assumption that 
"some day" the state court might "conclude that there is some personal reason" 
that would not disqualify an individual. 122 Harlan noted that the state 
court had never held any personal reason as an acceptable basis for someone to 
condition their availability for work. He suggested that the majority should 
not assume that it would ever do so. 
Second, Brennan tried to show that the scheme was discriminatory by 
referring to another South Carolina law that protected individuals from being 
compelled to work on Sunday if such work would violate their religion. 
However, Harlan again effectively attacked Brennan's claim. He pointed out 
that this law was not part of the unemployment statutes at issue and in fact 
only had force in times of national emergency when the state authorized 
employers to operate on Sunday. Nevertheless, it seemed that Brennan was 
trying to paint the disqualification provision as discriminatory so that 
Braunfeld would not require him to apply a free exercise doctrine that 
122 Id . at 420, n. 1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
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excluded the compelling-interest standard. But Urennan did not incorporate 
his suggestion that the provision ~as discriminatory into his formulation of 
the strict scrutiny approach he sanctioned. His opinion did not even imply 
that the Court would apply strict scrutiny only if challenged legislation ~ere 
discriminatory, 
Flawed by Brennan's messy attempts to save Braunfeld, the Sherbert 
opinion left confusion in the free exercise field. While denying that 
Braunfeld was overruled, the Court adopted an approach that was at odds with 
that case unless Sherbert were narrowly read as filling a hole left by Warren 
in Braunfeld. But if Sherbert were read in such a way, it would produce 
several questions. The distinction between direct and indirect burdens might 
still be valid. After all, since Sherbert did not address a direct burden, 
its strict scrutiny doctrine might not apply in cases containing such a 
burden. And since Sherbert distinguished Braunfeld as presenting a less 
direct burden, it might suggest that when future courts heard free exercise 
challenges they might have to apply the less comprehensive test announced in 
Braunfeld when burdens could be deemed less direct than the one in Sherbert. 
Sherbert might also require that future courts distinguish between indirect 
burdens resulting from general laws and those arising from discriminatory 
legislation. Full strict scrutiny might apply only when legislation was 
discriminatory and placed indirect burdens on free exercise. Brennan's 
attempts to save Braunfeld substantially undermined his goal of firmly 
establishing strict scrutiny in Sherbert as the predominant doctrine in the 
free exercise field. 
Justice Harlan dissented in Sherbert. He had joined Frankfurter's 
concurring opinion in Braunfeld, and with Frankfurter now retired Harlan led 
the anti-exemptions camp. He criticized the Sherbert majority for both 
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contradicting Braunfeld and reaching an illegitimate result. He couirt not 
understand Brennan's position that the burden in Braunfeld was less direct 
than the one in Sherbert. After all. the Sunday Closing Law threatened to 
drive Braunfeld out of business, but Sherbert merely wanted to collect several 
weeks of unemployment compensation. Harlan thought that "any differences 
between this case and Braunfeld cut against [Sherbert]. ,,123 Justice Ste~7-
art, in a concurring opinion, made the same argument about Braunfeld's 
burden. 1?4 Harlan also disagreed with result of applying the strict- the 
scrutiny approach, a result he believed was discriminatory. He asserted that 
"[t]he meaning of today's holding ... is that the State must furnish 
unemployment compensation benefits to one who is unavailable for work if the 
unavailability stems from the exercise of religious convictions. The State, 
in other words, must single out for financial assistance those whose behavior 
is religiously motivated, even though it denies such assistance to others 
whose identical behavior ... is not religiously motivated. u125 This 
"accommodation of religion,,126 would be "permissible,,127 if the legisla­
ture had chosen to enact it. But Harlan's point was that they had not, that 
123 Id . at 421 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
124Brennan's majority opinion was flawed, but this criticism was not 
necessarily legitimate. Harlan and Stewart seemed to regard the severity of 
the burden and the directness of the burden as the same concept. But they are 
not necessarily synonymous. The consequences of the burden in Braunfeld were 
clearly more potentially severe than those in Sherbert. However, the burden 
in Sherbert might be considered more direct. In Sherbert, South Carolina 
denied Sherbert a governmental benefit, unemployment compensation. But in 
Braunfeld, the Sunday Closing Law limited Braunfeld's ability to reap economic 
benefits generated in the private sector. Government was responsible for the 
burden in both cases, but the burden in Sherbert could conceivable have been 
seen as more direct. 
125 Id• at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) 
126 I d. 
127 Id . 
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the unemployment compensation legislation had heen designed and interpreted tn 
provide assistance solely to individuals whose unemployment resulted from 
downturns in the business cycle. He simplv believed that instances "in which 
the Constitution may require special treatment on account of religion are 
tl128 
. few and far between. . 
Although Harlan did not think exemptions were required, he did not 
believe legislatively crafted ones would violate the establishment clause. He 
did not assail the Court for fueling a conflict between the two religion 
clauses, but Justice Stewart did. Stewart, who had joined Brennan's dissent 
in Braunfeld, strongly supported the pro-exemptions position in the free 
exercise field. But he decried the "positively wooden,,129 interpretation 
he believed the Court had given the establishment clause in other cases, 
particularly in School District v. Schempp,130 which the Court had decided 
on the same day as Sherbert. In that case the Court had concluded that "to 
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular 
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.,,131 Stewart asserted that as a result of this kind of construc­
tion of the establishment clause "there are many situations where legitimate 
claims under the Free Exercise Clause will run into head-on collision with the 
Court's insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment 
Clause.!l132 Sherbert was just such an instance. Stewart argued that under 
the Court's approach to the establishment clause, South Carolina should be 
128 Id . at 423 
129 Id . at 414 (Stewart, J., concurring) 
130374 U.S. 203 (1963) 
131 Id . at 222 
132 Id . 
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forced to treat Sherhert' s rei i,gious reasor; for qual j fvin,o.; her empir}\'men! 
availability in the same ~av it treated anv other personal reason for qualifv­
Ing avaiLability. "To require South Carol ina to so administer its laws as to 
pay public money to [Sherbertl is ... clearly to require the State to 
\' oL1.te the Estahlishment Clans("" as construeri by this Court. ,,1~H Since, he 
argued, the Court had disapproved of governmental support of religion, it 
contradicted the establishment clause when it ordered a free exercise exemp­
tion so that Sherbert could receive unemployment compensation. Because 
Stewart supported religious exemptions, he believed the Court should alter its 
interpretation of the establishment clause to eliminate the conflict between 
the two clauses and to clearly permit legislative bodies to respect religious 
diversity by granting statutory exemptions. 
The majority's response to Stewart's criticism was anemic. The majority 
obviously did not want to engage in a careful scrutiny of their free exercise 
and establishment clause doctrines. Brennan, in the majority opinion, did not 
apply the Schempp doctrine to determine whether or not a religious exemption 
would in fact be unconstitutional. Instead, he simply called the exemption 
"nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of 
religious differences.,,134 Douglas filed a concurrence to address the 
question of potential conflicts between Sherbert and the establishment clause. 
He asserted that 
[t]he fact that government cannot exact from me a surrender of one 
iota of my religious scruples does not, of course, mean that I can 
demand of government a sum of money, the better to exercise them. 
For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the 
133 Id . at 415 

134 Id . at 409 (opinion of the Court) 
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~s()vernment cannot du a tile individuaL, nut in tf~rm..:; of ,,'ha' the 
1 J ...individual can exact from the government.') 
For Douglas, Sherbert was not attempting to exact a S:lm from the state in 
u der til hetter exercise her religion, she was simply seeking unemployment 
/lenefits as an unemployed worker. But he failed to address the fact that the 
state had disqualified her for benefits because her unemployment resulted from 
a personal objection. The Court had ruled that states could not deny compen­
sation when unemployment resulted from religious practices. Brennan incll1ded 
statements similar to those of Douglas. He suggested that there was no 
conflict between the religion clauses because the Court had not required 
states to create unemployment compensation schemes for individuals who became 
unemployed because of adherence to their religious beliefs. The Court had 
simply ruled that if the states chose to create unemployment compensation 
systems, they could not deny compensation when unemployment resulted from 
religious practices. But Brennan's argument forced him to further explain 
that the case might have been decided differently or a conflict might have 
arisen if "an employee's religious convictions serve to make him a nonproduc­
tive member of society.,,136 Harlan rightly attacked this "rather startling 
disclaimer,,137 in Brennan's opinion. Harlan believed that drawing such 
distinctions between types of religious adherents was very "inappro­
priate.,,138 At any rate, the majority really did not address the thrust of 
the criticism, that the Court had apparently singled out Sherbert, to use 
Harlan's words, and excluded her from the disqualifying provision because her 
135 Id . at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring) 

136374 U.S. at 410 

137 374 U.S. at 420, n. 2 

138 Id. 
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per sona 1 rea son for qua1 i f ying her ;1 va j 1d. biIi !- Y ~,' as rell 0 us. That t tlE' 
reason, Stewart argued, the exemption contradicted the establishment clause. 
In sum, Sherbert stands as a confusing precedent. It di.d es!~ablish 
strict scrutiny in the free exercise field, but it also includect contra/lic 
tions and quaLifications that left two main questions ahout the precjse 
application of the doctrine. First, did strict scrutinv apply when free 
exercise burdens were direct as well as indirect? And, secondly, did tne 
doctrine also apply when indirect burdens resulted from generally applicable 
secular regulations as well as allegedlv discriminatory ones? The Court wOllld 
suggest answers to these questions in subsequent cases, but the Court did not 
completely clarify the free exercise fieJd until 1981. 
In addition to the questions of application, Sherhert also intensified 
the potential conflict between the two reI ion clauses without effectivelY 
explaining a doctrinal solution to that problem. In a series of casps 
beginning in 1965 and dealing with draft exemptions, the potential for 
conflict became very real. But the Court again avoided directly addressing 
it. 
These cases did not significantly add to the development of free 
exercise jurisprudence, but they did serve to point out the potential conflict 
between the two religion clauses in the area of religious draft exemptions. 
They also highlighted the Court's difficulties in defining reI ion. That 
definitional problem rendered the Court extremely cautious in evaluating 
claims in the religion fields. The draft cases were based on the conscien­
tious ohjector provision of the federal selective service law. This provision 
provided that the draft Jaw did not "require any person to be subject to 
combatant training and service in the armed forces . . . who, b.v reason of 
religious train.ing and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation In 
individual's belief i.n a reLJtlnn to it SurJrpme Bping involving duties superior 
to those arising from ar1\' h1lman reLation, but rioes notincllJ(fe essenti ii'v 
pol i tica 7. soc i 0 log i cal, 0 r philo ,(:; 0 phi c a j , . j e r,7<:; 0 rame r' (1 1r per.'i n nam' r: Ii 
raispd potentiallv serious first amendment quec.;tions, but the r'ourt .c~ener;{11v 
avoided de,1.ling ,,-lith them. Howe\er. concurring and dissentin:; opini(lw,:;, taken 
to;;ether, reveaJ ed the grave nature (If the potential confliet heth'een the 
clauses. 
rn <}efc:lger V. n.lte. tates '1 j, an In IVl ua vIO "-'as convlctecco U" d S ( 1"6 -) 1{fa .. d' . d 1 h . 1 
for refusing to submit to induction challenged the provision as a violation of 
the estahlishment clause, free exercise, and equal protection. The lower 
court hi-ld helrl that the provision's "Supreme Being" reference excluded 
r's non-theistic religion, so he challenged the provision as religjousl v 
discriminatory. The Court dodged the constitutional issue\ however, and held 
t hat even t'hough the provision did mention "Supreme Being, I' its scope was not 
Limited only to individuals who adhered to theistic religious sects. 'fhe 
Court gave a broad interpretation to the statutory definition of religion, 
requiring administrators of the provision to ask whether or not "the claimed 
belief occup[ied] the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox 
belief in God h[eld] in the life of one clearJy qualified for exemp­
tion.,,141 Justice Douglas suggested in a concurring opinion that the free 
exercise clause and equal protection required the Court to apply this broad 
139Quoted in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 336 (1970) (emphasis 
added) 
14°380 U.S. 163 
141 Id. at 184 
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11 )definition of reI i I) n.+ - Rut t· hP It e f i Tl i t ion ~'J a s so broad that l t m r: t 
even have included the beliefs based on "political~ sociological, or philo­
sophical views" that the provision expressly exrluded, though U;e Court 
claimed it did not. 
The Court majority riisi.ntegrated whiLe addressing the same issue in 
f/e Ish v . Unit e d S tat e oS (1 970 ). 143 I nth i seasean ind i v i dua1 ',J h0 \~. a s (' 0 n­
vic ted for refusing to submit to the draft challenged government's refusal to 
classify him as a conscientious obiector. At first he denied that his beliefs 
"lere religious, having been formed IItby reading in the fields of histnry and 
sociology. 11,144 But in light of the Court's broad statutory interpretation 
of religious beliefs in Seeger, Welsh decided that his beliefs Here in fact 
religious. A plurality of four, Justice Black writing the opinion~ stretched 
the statutory provision to include Welsh's beliefs, which were clearly 
grounded in secular sources. The plurality again denied that it was effec­
tively deleting the statutory exclusion of purely "political, sociological, or 
philosophical views." But it mav have clone just that. 
Justice Harlan concurred in the result but refused to join the plural 
ity's extension of the statutory definition of religion. He argued that the 
Court had effectively included non-religious beliefs within the meaning of the 
conscientious objector provision. Harlan concurred in the result because he 
analyzed the claim under the establishment clause. Although he believed that 
Congress would be upholding "neutrality" if it refused to grant any draft 
exemptions, Harlan concluded that once it chose to grant conscientious 
exemptions, Congress could not restrict the exemption system to include only 
142 Id • at 188 

143396 U.S. 333 

144 Id . at 341 (quoting brief for appellant) 
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aIi her e n t s f I) thE' S t J C fa i h s . '1n r ' "(I \ -e ;', ben (-' Lrl t hare 0 ng res s c [) 111 d no t eve n 
limit the exemption to reI iOllsly motivated conscientious objection. For 
Harlan, onre Congress decided to exempt conscientious ol>jectors from militarY 
service, it could not dis riminate against individuals Fhose conscientiiJ'JS 
ohj ec t ion to war \.-ias s i neere though no t ground ed in rp 1 0 n . Ha r Li:ln Ion(' 1u:i 
ed that the non-discrimination requirement of the establishment clause 
rendered unconstitutional the exclusion of purely "pol tical. sociological, or 
philosophical views" from the conscientious objector provision because it 
preferred religion over non-religion. He relied on Schempp and other rases to 
support his position. 
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Stewart, dissented. 
Thev believed that Welsh's beliefs were secular and consequently outside the 
scope of the conscientious objector provision. White's opinion primarily 
responded to Harlan's concurrence. White noted that Harlan's condemnation of 
religious exemptions as discrimination was unfounded since "the First Amend­
ment itself contains a religious classification.,,145 The potential for 
conflict between the religion clauses became clear in White's contemplation ot 
the proper meaning of governmental "neutrality" toward religion: 
We have said that neither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is the 
goal of the First Amendment. "Neutrality," however, is not self­
defining, If it is "favoritism" and not "neutrality" to exempt reI i 
gious believers from the draft, is it "neutral ity" and not "inhibition" 
of religion to compel religious believers to fight when they have 
special reasons for not doing so, reason to which the Constitution gives 
particular recognition?146 
145 Id . at 372 (White, J., dissenting) 

146 Id. 
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It \·;ould be Logically impossihle to comi)i.rlr the -;;;trict establishment posi' ion 
I)f the Court in Schempp with the highl y accnmmodating fp>e exercise posit ior: 
in Sherbert. Either accommodations fif rei i,gion were permissible under the 
estahlishment clause to some extent and the 
,,147
.1nd State could not he absolute, or the separa.t I on '·ias nmplet ann 
accommodation was impermissible. The Court admitted that it "has struggled to 
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of ~hich are cast 
in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, 
would tend to clash with the other.,,148 The real problem seemed to be that 
if the Court's establishment clause precedents were taken to their logical 
extreme, they would prohibit both free exercise and statutory religious 
exemptions. To avoid this conclusion, the Court did not adhere rigidly to 
those precedents, but with no systematic way to determine when those prece­
dents controlled and when thev did not, the Court made ad hoc decisions. 
probably depending on the result the justices wanted to reach. The Court 
labelled some accommodations "benevolent neutrality,,149 while striking dC1I:n 
others as "establishments of religion.,t150 The problem was that stabLish­
ment doctrine was theoretically absolute but its application was arbitrary. 
In theory free exercise exemptions would contravene establishment doctrine, 
but the Court chose not to apply the doctrine to reach that conclusion. 151 
147Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (quoting Thomas 
Jefferson) 
148Wal z v. Tax C omm 'n , 397 U. S. 664, 668- 6 9 (1 970 ) 
149 Id• at 669 
150 )See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971 
151 A detailed discussion of the potential conflict between the two 
clauses and their corresponding judicial doctrines is beyond the scope of this 
paper. These draft cases should demonstrate that the possibility is quite 
real. 
~ 'L Tht~ His(-' ()f Free Exerc;s£' Strict ()erul inv. 
11 iIi g h : (: d t· i e pn E' n t i ;:1. L f () r (: () :) r 1 i ( t 
.., ,..) 
In Gdlette L United States (1971) i).;.. and an accOmpanYln~ 
c() U r t h(' a r d the appeals of t \...' 0 more i. ncl i vi.du a 1s \-:h[) id' r C II n,,' i ed tor 
refusing to suhmit to induetion. 
t u r s " : The v 11 eli e v r> d t hat the i r r eli g ion s pre v (-'. n ted the iT) J r r; 11 f ht i 
Vie t nam V'I arb e (' aus e i t i-I a san unj us twar . Sinc e the v did not () ppes e II par ti c i ­
pation in \.Jar in any form," they Here outside the consci0.ntiolls objector 
provision of the draft law. As a result, they arguert that the provision 
violated both reLigion lauses because it: discriminated among rcljgLolls sects. 
The Court obviously could not agree with them because it had painted 
i tsplf into a corner with Seeger and (.,reish. The Court had construed the 
COIlscienLious objection provision so that it came perilouslv close to exempt­
ing from military service individuals who possessed non-religious objections 
to all ~ar. If the Court were also to hold unconstitutional the distinction 
bet~een comprehensive and selective objection, it would virtuallY transform 
the United States military into a volunteer force because consistency might 
then demand that non-religious, selective objectors couJd not be compellerl to 
serve. If an individual's objection to the Vietnam war "occup[ied] the same 
place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God h[eld] in the 
life of one who clearly qualified for exemption",154 he could be entitled 
to an exemption. 
The Court devoted much of its Gillette opinion to the establishment 
question, but it also analyzed the free exercise claim. However, the Court 
did little to clarify the Sherbert opinion. Justice Marshall, writing the 
152401 U.S. 437 
153Negre v. Larson 

154 Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) 
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,...tJlO;lted a deferential stance tCH.'a.rd C(:ngr<'ss' asserted ,just-ifi ations [flf 
infringing free exercise. ~arshdLl rropo'-;erl sever:il <t1] edJ"\ comrelling 
interests whjch wouldiustif\? the infringement. 1i3S He s 
1l'1:, "7gc)\.ernmentai inter(~''itc.;'' 56 in ";:'l[OrUf ItO; . • . marmot r' 
I' ., .. 1")8dnd 1';";E'eding out spurlous cLums . justified t:H~ irLt:r.ing"·mer:t of free 
exerClse. The Court's fear of a fLood of claims. both legjtimatc and fraudu­
! (' n t. res t r a i ned i tin Gj 11 e t t e. But at 1 e as tone 1ower C Q U [' t had f 0 11 n d the 
manprHier ar;-,;umr'nt nnt to be compel ing. 159 And concern ahout fr;:1,uci1l1 ent 
claims was not a cHse-specific compell ng interest but was an argument agai~st 
religious ~xemptions per se. If the Court were going to accept that argument 
in Gillette, honesty should have demanded that it ahandon strict scrutiny 
15 t must be recalled that a conclusion about whether or not "raisfingl 
and "illpport ingj armies," {'.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, was a compelli.ng 
interest did nut satisfy the strict scrutiny doctrine. ~ot only did the 
overall goal have to be compelling, but there also had to he a more specific, 
rompelling reason not to exempt religious adherents whose free exercise a 
challenged statute burdened. 
156 Id . at 462 
157 Id . at 462 
158 Id. at 456 
159In United States v. NcFadden~ 309 F.Supp. 502 (D. N. Calif. 1970) the 
district court heard a claim almost identical to that in lVegre (Gillette's 
companion case). It held that the free exercise clause required exemptions 
for selective objectors. The district judge noted that the pool of draft-age 
men would increase from 121 million in 1965 to 18t million by 1980 t with that 
gain perhaps offsetting the exemption of selective objectors. He also 
suggested that before selective objectors were drafted, government ought to 
pursue the less-restrictive means of revoking college deferments (then 
numbering around two million) and should activate the additional two million 
men in the active and standby reserves. Although the district judge did not 
suggest the possibility of drafting women, that course too would provide a 
means less-restrictive of religious liberty than drafting selective objectors. 
It would also eliminate questions of sex discrimination and the draft. See 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding requirement that only males 
register with the selective service system) 
§ 'L The Rise of Free Expn~is(' Stri t Scrutinv. 
i u d i cia rv's d iff i cuI tiesf n i d f n t Lb,' j Il;-~ fJ aud II r nt: r e Jig i 0 uscLd m:-;. 1 60 
\Iarshall aLso feared that requirin<~ tree- f'\:ercise (~xemptions tor select-ivc 
objectors "would involve a [pal danger of prrati," or e"('D di3crimlnator 
dcr'ision-ma.ldn;;s in administrative' practice.,,161 \·:hi!p his COflC{,C! ~:a,s 
probabl Y not completely unjustified, he \eTaS us lng this appreh~'nsi:)n thO:lt 
hypothetical, administrative religious discrimination to jus ify an ~vident 
statutory discrimination on the basis of rel.igions beliefs. But be did n~)t 
view the case in this way because hp appJ ied Ii very restrictive notion of 
religious discrimination to the facts of the case and found that the conscien­
tiOllS objection provision was not discriminatory on its face. 162 ~arshall 
also accepted government's assertion that exemptions for selective objectors 
might threaten the morale of those called to serve. Again, at least one 
district conrt had considered that argument and had determined that it \..;a<; :wt 
160The district court in l1cFadden also noted that the Supreme Court, in 
both Sherbert and Seeger~ had already rejected the contention that preventing 
fraudulent claims was a sufficiently compelling interest to justify an 
infringement of free exercise. 309 F.Supp. 502, 508 
161 Id • at 455 
162He denied that the draft law was facially discriminatory because it 
"does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or religious 
belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning war. . .. [It] does not 
single out any religious organization or religious creed for special treat­
ment." Id. at 450-51 (emphasis added). This incredibly narrow view of 
religious discrimination was so superficial as to be almost disingenuous. 
That the statute classified individuals on the basis of differences in their 
individual religious beliefs rather than differences in their sectarian 
affiliations does not seem especially significant. The statute granted an 
exemption to individuals whose religious beliefs led them to oppose all wars 
but denied the exemption to other individuals whose religious beliefs led them 
to oppose a particular war. The discrimination on the basis of religion was 
obvious. 
§ 3. The Rise of Free Exercise Strict Scrutiny. 
compelling,163 Some of the interests ~arshall accepted as iustifications 
of the infringement of free exercise might be seen as compelling, but not 
convincingly so. In fact, Marshall's shot-gun approach. accepting a mYriad of 
compelling interests, might suggest that: he was uncomfortable ,,>lith relYing on 
anyone as being definitivel)" compelling. Moreover, Marshall made no a temp 
to determine whether or not government could use some less restrictive means 
to achieve its goals. 164 Therefore, Gillette did not stand as a clear and 
strong application of strict scrutiny. It represented the Court's reluctance 
to grant exemptions in the face of several inherent problems with the doc­
trine, as well as the Court's great deference to Congress in military matters. 
Gillette really did not answer any of the questions arising out of Sherbert 
and, consequently, did not help to clarify free exercise jurisprudence. 
However, in 1972, t he Court decided Wisconsin F. Yoder165 and made 
clear that strict scrutiny was a predominant free exercise approach. In this 
case Amish parents challenged Wisconsin's compulsory education law, under 
which the state had fined them for withdrawing their children from school 
bf~fore they reached the age of sixteen. The Amish parents believed that 
spnding their children to secondary school would violate their religious 
tenets. They believed that while their children needed an elementary educa­
tion, secondary education would instill in them the sinful values of the 
modern world and would lead them to abandon their faith. They sought reli­
gious exemptions from the compulsory education law. The Court, applying 
strict scrutiny, granted their request for exemptions. 
163The court in McFadden thought it "quite obvious that men who are 
drafted in opposition to deep-seated convictions do not make good soldiers" 
and would cause morale problems for the military. 309 F.Supp. 502, 507-08 
164See n. _, supra. 
165406 U.S. 205 
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fn addition to providing a clear S3nct ion of strict scrutiny genera~l , 
Yoder settled one of the issues left unclear bv 8herhert. Yoder tau,'?;ht that 
whE'n the Court heard a challenge to;1 statute v:hich "las generally applicahle 
and burdened free exercise directly, it would apply strict scrutiny. Sherbert 
had aIr e. ady s h cn; n all e a s t t hat the Co u r t \-:0 U Jd a 1 s (1 v t he doc t r i ne \·,:hef; 
discriminatory legislation hurdeneci free exercise only indirectly. The 
combinat ion of Yoder and Sherbert \.;ould require the Court to addl tionally 
apply strict scrutiny when discriminatory legislation burdened free exercise 
directly. So the only real question remaining unanswered after Yoder was 
whether the Court would apply strict scrutiny when generally applicable 
legislation burdened free exercise only indirectly or retain the less strict 
Braunfeld test in those instances. 
Chief Justice Burger. writing for the six-to-one majority in Yoder, 
reaffirmed a broad interpretation of Sherbert, noting that "only those 
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance 
.. 1 . h f . fl" ,,1661.egltlmate c alms to t e ree exerclse 0 re 19lon. This sentence was 
but a restatement of the least-restrictive-means and compelling-interest 
standards. Furthermore, Burger swept aside contentions that because the 
compulsory attendance law was secular and generally applicable it did not 
violate Yoder's free exercise rights: 
[T]his case [cannot] be disposed of on the grounds that [the law] 
applies uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not, on 
its face, discriminate against religions or a particular religion, 
or that it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns. A regula­
tion neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless 
166 Id . at 215 
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()ff(~ncl the consti tut iona t rer;uir<C'Inent tor government;d neutrali t\' 
[toward religion] if it unduly burdens the free exercise of 
religion. 167 
So with Yoder, strict scrutiny was well on its way to becoming a comprehensive 
doctrine for evaluating most free exercise violations. 
The Court held that the state's compulsory attendance law was not 
essential to achieve some compelling interest. The state had argued that its 
interest in preparing the children to be self-reliant and to participate in 
the political process justified the requirement. Burger, noting that the 
Amish were "productive and law-abiding members of society,,,168 held that 
compelling Amish children to attend school was not essential to the achieve­
ment of this goal because the Amish lifestyle also generated the desired 
result. And to the state's argument that the children should be compelled to 
attend school in case they eventually rejected the Amish way of life, Burger 
similarly responded that he doubted that "Amish children, with their practical 
agricilltural training and habits of industry and self-reliance, would become 
burdens on society because of educational shortcomings.,,169 Since the 
Amish community would provide the children with a form of alternative voca­
tiona] education, the Court concluded that the free exercise clause mandated a 
religious exemption for the Amish. The exemption would not undermine the 
state's goals, so it was an acceptable, less-restrictive means. 
The state, however, countered with the Prince precedent, arguing that 
when the issue involved the welfare of children, the doctrine of parens 
patriae gave the state broader power than when only adults were involved. In 
167 ld . at 220 

168 ld. at 222 

169ld . at 224 
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Prince the Court hac! dec'] irH~d to appl v Lric t scrutinv to a state's appJ ic;t­
tion of its child labor law against soLicitation activities of Jehovah's 
vJitnesses, though the majority implied that strict scrutinY might have been 
the approach applied if only adult conduct had been at issue. Hm,-('ver, Burger 
cited Brennan's rJdssification of Prince in his Sherbert opinion as a case 
presenting the regulation of conduct deemed a "substantial threat to public 
safety, peace or order." He concluded that Yoder was not a case "j n which any 
harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, 
peace, order, or welfare has heen demonstrated or may be properly 
inferred.,,170 Moreover, Burger noted, the parental right to privacy pro­
tected by the fourteenth amendment overrode the state's power under parens 
patriae since requiring Amish children to attend secondary school might have 
led to the eventual extinction of the faith itself. Therefore, Prince was not 
relevant. 
The Yoder ruling apparently was qualified in a few important w'ays. If 
the Amish had objected to elementary education, for instance, the case might 
have turned out differently, as Burger implied and Justice White noted in a 
concurring opinion. But a different conclusion in such instances did not 
undermine the strict scrutiny approach. The Court could easily conclude that 
requiring elementary education was essential to achieve a compelling interest. 
In addition, Burger stressed that the children would receive vocational 
training in the Amish community, but this emphasis does not contradict a 
strict scrutiny approach either. Burger intended it to show that providing an 
exemption would not undermine the state's goals. Yoder definitivelyestab­
lished strict scrutiny as the standard of review for free exercise claims. 
170 Id . at 231 
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Burger qualified the opinion in ,~ddltional ways. He spent 1 great ciE'al 
of time emphasizing how old and respe(:ted the Amish religion was, and he 
(~arefullv riescribed the outlook and requirements of the faith. He made clear 
t-hat there was no doubt that their objection to seconriarv ('dU(,,'ltion '-':as 
.. f j r mLv g r 0 undedin . . . c en t r airelig i 0 usc 0 nee p t s " 1 7 1 0 f the Am ish 
faith. These qualifications, seemed to serve an unspoken purpose. Th~ 
opinion fully endorsed strict scrutiny in general. Its support for that 
doctrine was unconditional. But the opinion also included so many specifi 
references to the Amish way of life that its holding was somewhat restricted 
to the facts of the case. Religious objectors of other sects would have to do 
more than simply invoke the Yoder precedent to gain an exemption from compul­
sory education laws. Religious sects not as well established as the Amish or 
those which did not provide community bonds as strong as those of the Amish 
would probably not quali for a f r e e ex e r cis e exemp t ion un 1e s s 1'0d e r \~. e r " 
extended. The Court was apparently concerned about generating a tide of ne~ 
claims, reviewing claims made bv adherents to obscure faiths, or faring the 
task of ferreting out fraudulent claims. Somewhat limiting the holding of 
I~der to its specific facts, the Court guarded itself against these hypotheti­
cal situations. 
Justice Douglas dissented in Yoder for two reasons. First, he helieved 
that the Court should have based its opinion on the desires of the Amish 
children to stop attending school rather than on their parents desire to keep 
them within the community. Douglas feared that the parents might force the 
children into a lifestyle against their will and, by depriving them of 
secondary education, make it difficult for them to abandon that lifestyle. 
Douglas also criticized much of Burger's careful qualifying. Douglas thought 
171 Id . at 210 
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"t he (->tTIphas i s of the COllI't OIl the ! };1\" amI n f(t(;f' record of the Am L s h . . • 
[was] quite irrelevant. A religion is a r ligion irrespective of what the 
misdeme;:lnor or felony records of its members might he. ,,172 Douglas feared 
that the Court was narrowing its definition of legitimate H'l i3Lon hv 0mpha­
sizing the hi.story and commlln.ity bonds of the Amish. He riisagrer:d with 
Burger's portrayal of the Amish lifestyle as If'idvllic agrarianism, ,,,17:3 
taking it as a way of deeming the Amish faith more entitled to free exercise 
exemptions than other religions. 174 Douglas wanted the Court to adopt as a 
first amendment standard, the broad interpretation of reI ion in Seeger and 
Welsh, which Douglas took to include personal philosophical views. As noted 
above, this broad definition of religion aggravated the potential conflict 
between the two religion clauses in the draft exemption cases, but Douglas did 
not comment on the possibility of increased clause conflict resulting from 
this definition. 
Yoder, even with Burger's qualified stance, had illustrated full strict 
scrutiny in action. But two other cases from the same time period, Cruz 'v. 
Beta (1972) 175 and Johnson v. Robison (1974)176 showed that the Court 
was not going to apply the doctrine to evaluate all instances of free exercise 
bllnJens. 
172 Id • at 246 
173 Id • at n. 5 (quoting lower court judge) 
174In an attempt to show that Amish society was no more perfect than any 
other, Douglas noted that adolescent drinking was common and that suicide was 
rates among the Amish were equivalent to those of American society in general. 
Id. 
175405 U.S. 319 

176415 U.S. 361 
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In Cruz, a Buddhist prison inmate alleged that prison offi('i 1s discrim­
inated against his religion by denying him opportunities to practice his 
reJ ion. The lower courts had denied his chaJlenge without a hearing. The 
Court vacated their judgment and remanded the case for further prnceedings to 
~letermine if his rjght to free exercise \vas violated. The Court did not 
comment on the strict scrutiny approach. But noting the unique conditions of 
the prjson environment, the Court suggested that the Constitution required 
pr ison adminis tra tors to provide "reasonabl e oppo rtuni ties " for "all pr i son(~r s 
to exercise,,177 their religion. This statement implied that the courts did 
not have to apply strict scrutiny to allegations of free exercise burdens in 
prisons; they could apply a more lenient standard. 
The Court suggested the same for military matters in Robison. In this 
case, an individual who had fulfilled alternative civilian service as a 
conscientious objector, challenged Congress' disqualification of conscientious 
objectors from receipt of veterans' educational benefits. The Court rejected 
his challenge without even mentioning strict scrutiny, let alone applying it. 
Although Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinion of the Court, was very vague 
in his free exercise analysis, he seemed only to apply a rational-relationship 
test while implying that government's interest was compelling. He noted that 
the burden in this case was far less severe than the one in Gillette, but he 
did not evaluate the obviously different justifications for the two dissimilar 
hurdens. Instead, he noted that the aim of the secular, general law providing 
the benefits was not to interfere with free exercise, !'because to do so would 
not rationally promote the its purposes.,,178 He concluded that "in light 
of Gillette, the Government's substantial interest in raising and supporting 
177405 U.S. at 322, n. 2 

178Robison, 415 U.S. at 385 
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armi s ... is ... clearly '':;ilft'icipnt to sllsta.in the challengeo le01s1a­
. ,,179 ,tlon. . . . Despite his suggestion that the government s interest was 
compelling (or "substantial"L Brennan did not apply strict scrutiny. The 
Court established a much more lenient stanrlard for evaluatin~ free exercise 
claims involving any legislation louching on military matters. 
Douglas. the lone dissenter, attacked the majority and effectively 
pointed out its inconsistency with precedent. He noted that the law provided 
educational benefits to any veteran, regardless of whether he served in 
oversees combat or !'lived with his family in a civilian communi tv and worked 
,,180from nine to five as a file clerk on a military base .. As Douglas 
protested, Sherbert, Yoder, and other cases demanded a different result in 
this case. He quite correctly could not conceive of any compelling reason to 
draw a line between "conscientious objectors who performed alternative 
civilian service and all other draftees.,,181 The facts in Robison were 
strikingly similar to those in Sherbert. Yet in the latter case, the Court 
did not simply claim that the denial of unemployment benefits was constitu­
tional because it was secular and not aimed at the suppression of religious 
exercise. As the author of Sherbert, Brennan knew that the only relevant 
difference between that case and Robison was that the latter intruded into the 
military sphere. Nevertheless, he completed the process in this case that 
Marshall had quietly begun in Gillette, cutting an exception in the free 
exercise clause for military regulations. The most incredible feature of 
Robison was that only one justice objected to it. 
179 Id • 
180 Id . at 389 

181 Id . at 388-89 
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Despi te the Court I s re triet 1\ decis LEins in Cruz and Rohison, it 
continued to endorse free exercise strict scrutiny and resol\'e the douhts t 
bv Brennan's Sherbert opinion. Tn fact, Brennan quietly slippf:I(i a maior 
admission about that Sherbert opinion nlo his opininD in t.he Court's next 
major free e.xer('isf.~ case, l"'fc[)aniel ~. Pat~· (1<)78).1({2 In this case a 
preacher challenged a provision in Tennessee's constitutional con\'ention call 
which prohihited ministers from serving as delegates to the convention. A 
plurality of four applied strict scrutiny to strike down the disqualification. 
Brennan concurred in the result, believing that the provision infringed 
religious belief rather than conduct. Since religious belief was protected 
absolutely, he believed the Court did not have to apply any judicial balancing 
test at all, it should just strike down the provision as unjustifiable. In 
his concurring opinion Brennan refuted a lower court, which had relied on 
Braunfeld to suggest that the indirect burden on free exercise in McDaniel W;lS 
constitutional. In the course of this discussion Brennan stated in one 
sentence in a footnote that "[clandor compels the acknowledgement that to the 
extent that Braunfeld conflicts with Sherbert in this regard, it was over­
ruled.,,183 Although this admission was not binding precedent because it 
was merely a comment in a concurring opinion, it was not disputed in McDanie.l 
by any other justice on the Court. This minor point Brennan's opinion 
supports a view that after Yoder the Court probably considered strict scrutinv 
to be firmly established in the free exercise field. Moreover, the comment 
went part of the way toward answering the final question coming out of the 
Sherbert opinion: whether the Court would apply strict scrutiny or the more 
182435 U.S. 618 (striking down Tennessee's policy of disqualifying 
ministers from serving as delegates to state constitutional convention) 
183 Id • at 633, n. 6 
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len i e n t B/' ,:-i 11 n f e1 d t est \,' hen s (~ (: U1a r, g rw r 1 1 a F '':; i nd ire c t 1\" bun1f ~ W~ rl f 
exercise. The indirect burden in ,\lcDaniel resulted from a discriminator\' La"-;. 
so the Court's ruling could not remove that point Left open i.n Sherhert. 184 
The Court did remove that Itngering doubt Zlbout strict scrlltinv three 
years lati~r in Thoma.s L Review Board (1981).185 Thi.s case was simil r to 
Sherbert in that it involved a denial of 11nemployment compensation to an 
individual whose unemployment resulted from his religious practices. Thomas 
was a Jehovah's Witness who quit his job when his company closed the roll 
foundry in which he worked and transferred him to a department that produced 
tank turrets. He quit his job because he believed that his reI ion forbade 
him from directly participating in war production and because there were no 
open positions in the company that were not directly involved in war produc­
tiun. Indiana denied his request for unemployment, but the Court reversed 
their decision. 
Thomas differed from Sherbert in several important respects. First. 
Thomas had quit his job because of his religious beliefs, while Sherbert had 
been terminated because of hers. The Court, Chief Justice Burger writing for 
an eight-man majority, held this difference to be irrelevant. Burger reasoned 
that 
184McDaniel did seem to clear up one minor caveat lingering from the 
Sherbert opinion. Brennan had asserted in Sherbert that Braunfeld remained a 
valid precedent because the burden in that case was less direct than the one 
in Sherbert. The burden in McDaniel, involving no denial of a public, 
monetary benefit, might also be considered less direct than the one in 
Sherbert. Yet no justice even implied that the Court should compare the 
directness of the burden in McDaniel with the directness of the burdens in 
Sherbert and Braunfeld to determine whether strict scrutiny or the Braunfeld 
standard was applicable. The plurality simply cited Sherbert and Yoder and 
applied strict scrutiny, and Brennan conceded that Sherbert had overruled 
Braunfeld, at least in part. So McDaniel represented an implicit repudiation 
of Brennan's terse statement in Sherbert which was really never anything more 
than a flimsy excuse for not overruling Braunfeld in 1963. 
185450 U.S. 707 
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rldad Thomas sjmpl~; ;)resented hirw-;el f t th(~ . 1il ~l t t err e r 
line but refused to perform any ac.signf'rl v:ork, it must be assumed 
that he, like Sherbert, would have heen termi.nated by the em-
plover's action, if no other work was availahle. In both cases, 
th3 termination flowed from the fact that the emplnvment, once 
acceptable, became religiousLy objectionable because of changed 
conditions. 186 
The Court extended Sherbert to include individuals who quit their jobs because 
new conditions rendered their work religiously unacceptable. 
Thomas also diverged from Sherbert in another respect. Abstinence from 
Saturday labor was clearly a tenet of the Jehovah's Witness faith. However, 
Thomas and a co-worker in the turret plant, who was also a Jehovah's Witness, 
disagreed about whether or not producing tank turrets violated their religion. 
The co-worker had no religious objection to his job. The lower court also 
noted that "Thomas was 'struggling' "7ith his beliefs and was not able to 
'articulate' his belief precisely.,,187 Because of these problems the lower 
court perceived in Thomas' assertions, its suggested that his objection was 
probably based more on personal rather than religious belief. But Burger held 
that courts should not "dissect" a claimant's beliefs because he "admits that 
he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not articulat­
ed with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might 
employ.,,188 Nor should courts take cognizance of "not uncommon" "[i1ntra­
faith differences.,,189 Burger clearly restated the Court's opposition to 
186 1d. at 718 
187 1d. at 715 

188 1d. 

189 1d• 
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. d' . 1 1" h . f' h . 1qnt hat In IVHua SlncerItv was t e test. not Intra,alt consIstenCY. ' 
Burger concluded that Thomas' motivatinns w(~re rf·li:=;ious. 
Thomas di ffered from Sherbert j n one final and import;:!.nt rpspp!'t. 
Lnrliana's denial. of compens;{tion '{as not thp resu1t of rel ?ir l 1Js dis:','lmifL!­
tion. State courts had held that no personal reason for unemplovmpnt, 
J . . h' . 1 1 . 191reigious or at. erWIse, entlt e( anyone to compensatlon. ' Thomas pre­
sented the lone situation in which the Court had not clarified frep exercise 
doctrine since the Sherbert opinion: an indirect burden resul~ing from a 
secular, general law. Braunfeld required that the Court use a doctrine that 
did not include the compelling-interest standard of strict scrutiny. Without 
even mentioning Braunfeld Burger cited Sherbert and Yoder anet appl i,ed strict 
scrutiny. By closing the last caveat in Brennan's Sherbert opinion, the Court 
had at last undeniably overruled Braunfeld sub silento. ':)tripping it of lill.' 
legitimacy it still retained. Except for cases involving prisons or the 
militarY, courts were to use strict s rutinv to eV(11uate frep (·'\ercise 
ehallenges grounded in reJ igiousLv motivated conduct. 
FinaLly, applying strict scrutiny, Burger held that neither of [ndian:l's 
asserted interests were sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement of 
190 Id . at 715-16 ("One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim SI) 
bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled til 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here. and 
the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared hv 
all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, 
it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inqllire 
whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the 
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.") 
191 id . at 712 (The compensation statute "'is not intended to facilitate 
changing employment or to provide relief for those who quit work voluntarily 
for personal reasons. Voluntary unemployment is not compensable under the 
purpose of the Act, which is to provide benefits for persons unemployed 
through no fault of their own. "') (quoting Indiana Supreme Court) 
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the integrity of its compf'w-iation fund ,",'as a '1mpelling ;nterpst. And it a so 
exempti.ons suppcrted (~ither of [ndi.ana's assertNt inh'~·('sts. Cons('qupntl<" 
Thomas '\.{~-H:; ('nt'tIed to unemployment compensation. The COllrt a1 so hrieflv 
ad cI r (' ssed the po S sib i 1 i t v t hat the e x (~mp t ion v i G Lated the esta b 1 ishmen t 
c 1. au s e, but BH r g e r ci ted ,'" herb e r tand elj s m iss edt hat con ten t ion. 
It is clear that the Court did not introduce strict scrutiny in the free 
exercise field in one feJI swoop. Components of the doctrine had developed 
gradually in free exercise cases since 1940. The Court fused those components 
in 1963 in Sherbert, but in attempting to save a precedent which did not even 
haVf~ a majority opLnion, the Court left some questions about the use of (.;;trlct 
scrutiny in free exercise cases. One by one, the Court dismissed the doubts 
Left by Sherhert. The Court strongly endorsed free exercise i->cfutiny in Yoder 
in 1972 and c'ompletelv adopted it in 1981. 
At the same time, the Court became aware of some problems with applving 
strict scrutiny in the free exercise field. The potential for conflict 
between the two religion clauses of the first amendment became palpable for 
the Court in the draft-exemption cases (If the early 1970's. The Court also 
contemplated the potential for a flood of claims. some of them fraudulent, in 
those cases as well as in Yoder. Perhaps because of these problems, the Court 
moved to isolate cases involving prisons and the military from the reach of 
free exercise strict scrutiny. But by 1981, the Court had really done nothing 
about the problems that strict scrutiny could entail. It denied the serious­
192 Id . at 719 
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r:e .., " I) f the ('! aus e (' 0 nf 1 1 tin h (1 t h She T' I: e r taIld rh ()ma.',; • a v 0 i din:~ i tnt i (' 1 " 
in the draft-exemption cases hv sin~t him; the terms of the dratt: [m·.- in a\nid 
the cons ti t uti 0 na 1 que s t ion S 1 r' ttlO S (' cas (' s . 1he Court qualified its rulin~',:;, 
as in rrnrier. or applied the comp('ll in,a,-intt'rest standard! il,:prall\', ,:t.c; in 
Gillette, to guard against a potential Y!ond of 
" ,,19'3The Court vIOuld not tJe able to continue papering o\'er .. the prn 1)­
lems with the doctrine. The cases Houlrl get tougher in the 1()8r)!" and suppn t 
for f r e e exe r cisest ric t s c rut i ny vlO u l d f' rod e . I n fac t, ".;hi Je 1()81mark e (1 t tv 
final repuc1iati rHl of Braunfeld and the full establishment Clf the Sherheft 
doctrine, it also marked the beginning of the end for free exercise strict 
scrutiny. In Thomas, Justice Rehnquist: announced his opposition to the 
19'.1.doc t r i n e and 	0 u t 1 ine d his pIan [ () r the r eli g ion cIa11 S e s . . Wit h in ;1 de­
. 1 f if'lI i' h f' .~; f' ld 195 di.caceI he sa"" IllS p an more tllan u ~l er In t e ree exerC.Lse.le, an 
he mav gr't the resul t he sought for the establishment clause jn 19<)2. 196 
193 Sherbert 	 374 U. S. 398, 413 (Stewart, J., concurr i ng)f 
194Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720-727. Rehnquist sought to resurrect BraunfeLd 
and to overturn the broad interpretation of the establishment clause grounded 
in School District v. SchempPf 374 U.S. 203 (1963) and Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See~ in[ra, § 4. 
1955ee Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 
(1990) 
196 Lee v. Weisman, 59 U.S.L.W. 2095 (1st Gir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 
U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Mar. 18, 1991) (No. 90-1014) (striking down benediction 
delivered by clergy at public school graduation ceremony as establishment of 
religion) 
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§ 4. THE EROSION OF f'REF; EXERCISE STRICT SCRUTINY. 
In ,A-fcDaniel (1978),197 a plural itv of justices noted their approval 
of a lower court's application of strict scrutiny to decide a free exercise 
challenge to a state law criminalizing the sacramental use of pevote. 198 
Although they did not necessarily endorse the result of that court application 
of the docLI"ine, they did cite it approvingly as the correct approach to free 
exercise adjudication. 199 That plurality consisted of Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Four other justices--Brennan, 
Stewart, ~arshall, and Blackmun--did not join the plurality's opinion, but ~s 
pre\ious and subsequent cases showed, these four strongly supported free 
s _rIC,,scrlltl'n U reluctantexerC1se, t' t .".200r Only Justice White was to endorse 
197435 U.S. 618 
198The case was People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 
P.2d 813 (1964) 
199435 U.S. at 628, n. 8 ("[TJhe courts have ... precluded the 
application of criminal sanctions to the religious use of peyote, People v. 
Woody, ... or the religiously impelled refusal to comply with mandatory 
education laws past the eighth grade, Wisconsin v. Yoder. We need not pass on 
the concl usions reached in . . . Wood}', which [was] not revielved by this 
Court. Those cases are illustrative of the general nature of free exercise 
protections and the delicate balancing required by our decisions in Sherbert 
and ... Yoder, when an important state interest is shown.") 
200Brennan and Stewart had first endorsed the doctrine in dissenting 
opinions in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610-16 (1961) (dissenting 
opinions), and each had continued to support it. See, e,g., Thomas v. Review 
Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Justices Marshall and Blackmun had 
also joined the majority in Yoder and continued to support strict scrutiny. 
See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1615-23 
~.'L The Er (1 s ion r) f r r e e E>\ e fT 1C; eSt. ric t S c rut i ny . 
','(\ 1 
[r?e e~erciqe strict red. -' 1 As of 1978, 

1 e ;\ S t e i g h t 0 f the n i n e jus tic e s sup p0 r ted tT i (' t .S C r 11 tinv ina t 1,' d, S t, s (-:ne 

prohibition, flve to-four, and virtua1ly abolistlPd str t 5t'rutinv in t;l\' :rc(' 
e~';:?rciSe fi jei. /{cagan a.ppointment<; to thE' Court. while ce tainlv T);lt 
irr jp\/ t. (iu not fuLly ain this turnabout. Bpt\-,Tcen 1978 and 1990. or; \' 
hrC2 ustices herE' replaced. 202 A more important factor Ln the doctrinal. 
shift was the conversion of several justices from a pro-exemption to hnd anti-
exemption position. 203 The potential difficulties with strict scrllt nv 
also became more apparent as the Court faced challenges to tax laVe's, internal 
governmental policies, and federal lanJ-use decisions. ~hen the casps of the 
19S0's are vieKed t().~ether, the gradual (::[OS10n of strict scrutiny he(~omeq 
obvious. And that erosion began with Rehnquist's dissent in Thomas. 
(1990) (Black:nun, .1., dissenting). 
:2 [) 1\I!h i t e j 0 inecl Jus t ice Ha r 1an ! s dis sent in Sherbert \/. lie r n e r ,)7 1+ C. S . 
J93, 1{18-23 (1063) but supported strict scrutiny in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 237-41 (1972) (White, J., concurring). He did not believe there was 
a f r e e exere i s e vi 0 1at ion i n MeDan j e1, t+ 15 e. S. at 643 - 46 ( Wh i t e t J., cancur 
ring) (\\1hi te based his conclusion on equal protection). And during the 1980' ~ 
he supported strict scrutiny in free exercise cases involving unemployment 
compensation, see Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec .• 489 U.S. 820 
(1989), Hobbie v. Unemployment Appea.ls Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), and Thomas 
v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), but not in some other free exercise 
cas s. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. ~'. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 
1595 (1990') and L:vng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 u.s. 
660 (1988). 
202Stewart in 1981 (by O'Connor); Burger in 1986 (by the elevation of 
Rehnquist, whose associate justice seat was filled by Scalia); and Powell in 
1987 (by Kennedy, who did not take his seat until early 1988 because the 
Senate rejected Reagan's first choice for the seat, D.C. Appeals Court Judge 
Robert H. Bark, see R. Bork, The Tempting of America, 267-55 (19901). 
203E. g , Rehnquist, Stevens, Burger, and Powell. 
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dis t [Fill lw 

part lei pated in the elecLs ion I; rorler. 20 '; 

rse.d st i t c.;(Tlltinv in 
1110 r (' d f f C 11 1 t as e s :i n t: hat 0 pin ion. Al tho ug h the ext e nt 0 f Re hnqui s tIs 
'~uppo!t for free exercise strict scrutiny was unclear, he had not commented 
disapprovingl v of it in any opinion. 
But n Thomas. 205 Rehnquist broke with the majori~ty and announced his 
opposition to the application of strict scrutiny in this case. He criticized 
the majority for failing to adequately address the "tension, " as the majority 
put it, 206 which he believed had three causes. Two of his asserted causes, 
the application of the first amendment through the fourteenth to state (as 
opposed to onlY federal) activities and the growth of social welfare legisla­
lion, were not trulY causes for the conflict, though they did increase the 
opportunities for its occurrence. Rehnquist's third cause, which reallv vas 
the source of the problem, was the Court's interpretation of the clauses: "Bv 
broadlv construing both Clauses, the Court has consistently narrowed the 
channel between the Scylla and Charybdis through which any state or federal 
action must pass in order to survive constitutional scrutinv.,,207 His 
solution was to restrict the interpretations of both clauses. 
204406 U.S. 205 (1971) 
205 450 U.S. 707, 720-27 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
206450 U.S. at 719 ("There is, in a sense, a 'benefit' to Thomas 
deriving from his religious beliefs, but this manifests no more than the 
tension between the two Religion Clauses which the Court resolved in Sherbert . 
.") 

207 fd. at 721. 
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r th ~r E' 
Ikc! lPn, \'lhich the Court in Tlio:Tlas S. 11\1'1' H hnquist!'.:; dis f'nt. final1\ 
p: yj rli~ 0 n: st. Rehnqui sf d~':; s r I)d t t: r \ h r :1'';; hefe , :1 S t:~ t;-:' has 
(~ ( ..i~'racte(l a :-?,eneraJ statute . the putpnse n(' f~f of \·;h i c h i s to ach' anc;" the 
'-, (~(' i! : ·l r 
the State tu conform that statute to the dictates ot religious conscience of 
any group.,,20H But this position "'-as not the Bral1nfeld doctrine. That 
case hat[ required government to fulfill the least-restrictive-means require­
ment as well as the general-applicability and secular-purpose standards. 
\lthough Rehnquist would be satisfied with Braunfeld, he really wanted to push 
free exercise jurisprudence back to its status prior even to Cantr-..-e.ll v. 
Connecticut (1940).209 And that is precisely what the Court ultimately did 
in Smith IT (1990).210 He Hould also radically restrict the scope of the 
establishment clause. 211 
His criticism of the Court's weak attempt to address the issue of clallSC 
conflict was effective. In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1973),212 the Court had 
') 1 '3 .
compjleri its stabl ishment cl ause requirements from previous cases-·· into 
208Td . at 723 
209310 U.S. 296 
21°110 S.Ct. 1595 
211 He believed the establishment clause should be interpreted only to 
prevent government from "'throwing the weight of secular authorit[ies] behind 
the dissemination of religious tenets." Thomas, 450 U.S. at 726 (quoting 
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 248 [19481 [Reed, J., dissent­
ing1). This reinterpretation would not be pushing back establishment clause 
doctrine, for the Court had never interpreted that clause so narrowly. See 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
212403 U.S. 602 
213These cases included Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) and 
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
§ Ii. T h (~ Er 0 S ion 0 f Fr e e Ex e r ciseSt ric t SC fl1 t: i ny . 
. . . ..).\ J. 
d t h r e e - p r li 1!ldlClal te t.-' 
majr~rity dodged the possihilitv that a free exer"ls e,,-efriptic:n for Thom.iS 
con£11 ted tvith the estilbl ic.,hme:lt lccl<oe. ThE' majr)ri t,' el.>!') incd to av,l +:he 
But e\:en if the. rE:'f' {"=cr(~ise exemption \'.101atcd Uw ((·'[[ns () r.he Lemon 
test, '-'lhich the Court never admitted, it \·muld not necessari 
Rehnquist's soLution to the clause conflict, radically cut hack the scope of 
both clauses, went ~ell beyond what was necessary to cure the problem. The 
conflict could be resul\'ed either bv eliminating free exercise exemptions 
alone or bv loosening the strict rules of the Lemon test to permit some 
governmental accommodation of religion. However, easing the conflict did not 
require either clause to be stripped down to the degree Rehnquist desired. 
And any solution only needed to modify one of the clauses, not both. 215 
Rehnquist's failure to mention the availability of narrower solutions to the 
problem of clause conflict suggested that he was driven by ideological 
considerations more than true concern about the problem at Issue. In other 
words, clause conflict was a screen for an agenda designed to drasticallv 
roll-back the protections provided by both of the religion clauses. Recogniz­
ing Rehnquist's motivations, however, does not eliminate the existence of real 
conflict between the clauses that the Court refused to adequately address. 
An additional decline in support for free exercise strict scrutiny had 
been possible in 1981, as Justice Stewart, a strong supporter of the doctrine. 
214To pass establishment clause scrutiny legislation first had "have a 
secular purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must not 
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. '" Lemon, 403 at 
612-13 (1971) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. 664 [1970]). 
215 See P. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 
U.ehi.L.Rev. 1 (1962) 
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retired from the Court. Ho\·.ever, Rt'al~,ln":-: r placement for Slet..;art:, j'lsticE'. 
O'Connor, eventually proved to support strict scrutinv in the free exer~i 0 
field almost as strongly as Ste~art had. 216 
In the following year, however. support for fret' exercise strict 
"17scrutin\- dill e['ode turther. United State'; L Lee (1982)":' ! was .lnother 
case involving the Amish. Although the Court had granted them a lin~it:ed 
exemption from compulsory education laws in Yoder218 a decadE' earlier, th.::: 
Court was hostile to their request in Lee for a free e~ercise exemption from 
the payment of social security- paYToll taxes. In factJ the Court strained its 
analysis in the case to avoid granting the exemption. ~ost importantly, 
Justice St.evens, "'iho had joined both the plurality in HcDaniel and the 
majority in Thomas, defected to the Rehnquist camp. He endorsed Rehnquist's 
position in an opinion concurring in the result in Lee. 
The Amish challengers in Lee objected to participation in the social. 
security system because their religious beliefs prohibited it. They noted 
that Congress had statutorily provided for the exemption of self-emploved 
nlemhers of the Amish faith but had not extended the statutory exemption to 
Amish employers and employees generally. Burger, writing for the majority, 
(tid not extend the exemption judicially either. He applied strict scrutiny, 
but, as Stevens noted in dissent, Burger manipulated the governmental inter­
ests to avoid granting the exemption. There really was no compelling reason 
not to grant it. 
216 See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 
1606-15 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in result) and Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 724-34 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). 
217 455 U.S. 252 
218406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
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Bur g e r c 1. ted Bra un f e1d s e' .era1 time s \, i.l h 0 U t qua 1 i fie <..d~ IH}, h 'l ~~ ;j t: t tl e 
same time he restated the terms of strict scrutiny and nominally ;lPP .icd 
doctrine, not noting any contradiction. \!oreover, hi appllcatjon of s:rict 
s rut i n v ~'l asinep t. His f.i r s teonc .l U S Lon \';' a s t hat t hi ~ go \ e :::- tlmen t had 1 
II ~ ,
,11 
"a comprr.:=:hensive national social securi t\· svstem providing for \:olunLlfY 
participation wouLd be almost a contradiction in terms and tllfficuit, if not 
, '1 1 1 .. ,,')')0
wImpOSS1) e, to almlnlstcr. .... So he apparent.l found that government had 
c:ompel I reason not to make the system voluntary. But that concl'lsion was 
fai rly irn·;levant to this case because the Amish had not asl;:ed the Court to 
make the system voluntary; they had merely requested a narrow religious 
exemption. Strict scrutiny required that the over-arching goal. providing for 
the welfare of retired workers, had to be compelling, which it obviously was, 
and that government had to present some compelling reason for denying a 
t't,1 i.giOllS exemption to the Amish ehallengers. Burger suggested that !lit would 
t,P difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security system with 
.d fl" l' " ~) ? 1myrlac. 1 . f . f rom a WI e varIety. 0 re 19louS b Ie f s. -_.exceptIons· low1ng .e He 
~as attempting to invoke the Court's fear of a flood of claims. But even ~ith 
the great religious diversity of the United States, Burger identified only two 
sects whose religious tenets the tax might violate, the Amish and members of 
the Sai Baba faith. 222 The Amish had only qualified for the statutory 
exemption because they were members of "a religious community having its own 
219 Id . at 259 
220 Id. at 258 
221 Id . at 260-61 
222 Id. at 257, n. 6. (citing Henson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 835 (1976») 
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Jwe tare system. __ Since Sai Baba did TIClt provide its OHrl 
tern, a lower court had held that its members .tid not quaIl for the s tat:1 ~orv 
ex.emption. 
Cnder strict scrutiny, faithfuJ ~,' applied, Bur;~('r shCl'llcl hel\Z' p,ra ted 
the exemption. A~ Stevens pointed out in his concurrence, Congress had 
a1 ready exempted self-employed Amish v-lith no alleged negative impact on the 
social security system. He also noted that exempting the Amish would mean not 
only that they woul(t not have to pay the tax but also that they "loulct forego 
Lhe receipt of any benefits. The latter, Stevens suggested, would more than 
offset the former. ~oreover, since the Amish were members of a religious 
community which maintained its own type of welfare system, government's 
interest in comprehensive coverage would not be undermined to any greater 
degree than the state's interest in education was subverted by the exemption 
for the Amish in Yoder. 
But instead of applying this line of reasoning, Burger actually grounded 
his decision in considerations which were not presented in the case. He 
argueci that there was no way to distinguish the claim in Lee from a request 
for a religious exemption from the payment of income taxes. The Court Has 
clear]y not willing to entertain countless challenges to the income tax system 
hy conntless religious adherents presenting an array of objections. But 
again, this consideration was irrelevant to the decision in Lee. The Amish 
adherents had not challenged the income tax. Even if they did, Stevens noted 
in his concurrence, their claim could easi be distinguished from the claim 
against the social security tax. The latter tax was designed to fund a 
specific program, social security. Since the Amish had a local system which 
fulfilled the same interest that government sought to achieve with social 
223 Id. at 261 
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~ecurity, they coulJ be exempted from par'ticipation in the entire prcgr'am. 
However, the income tax was quite different. Stevens pointed out that "in the 
typical case the taxpayer is not in anv posi tion to suppJ \r the government \..Ji th 
,).) I 
an equivalent substitute for the objectionable use of his monev." ..... '-y And 
since the tederal lmdget contained so manv different elements, r;ortions of it 
would probably conflict with the reI ious principles of hundreds of thousands 
of people. Government could argue that granting far-reaching reI ious 
objections from the income tax would utterly cripple its ability to achieve 
any of its legitimate and compelling goals. That real possibility would 
surely be deemed a compelling interest. Burger's resolution of the social 
security issue on the basis of his actual deciding of the income-tax issue was 
a clear evasion of the real strict scrutiny considerations in Lee. Stevens was 
right in this respect. 
However, Stevens would not have reached the conclusion that he suggested 
the Court shoilld have reached under strict scrutiny. He used his concurring 
opinion to announce his opposition to the doctrine in the free exercise field. 
He believed that the Court's precedents more realistically required the Court 
to apply "a standard that places an almost insurmountable burden on any 
individual who [on free exercise grounds] objects to a valid and neutral la¥! 
of general applicability.,,225 Besides Gillette, which was actually been 
based on a nominal yet lenient application of strict scrutiny similar to that 
one in Lee, he relied on no case decided after Sherbert to support his 
argument. Nor did he mention Cantwell, Barnette, Murdock, or Gobitis. But 
cases that figured prominently in Stevens' list of citations were Braunfeld, 
the plurality decision which the acceptance of strict scrutiny had implicitly 
224 Id . at 262, n. (Stevens, J., concurring in result) 
225 Id . at 263, n. 3 
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tl,i~\en adul ts and minors that Slu"'r/1f',rt and ;'o(/e[' had substantial1\' t:nderc~.lt; 
and ReFnolds (1879),:227 an archai(~, v rtu;.d]v inc!. iph~rah1c orinion that 
vrecedent than did strict scrutiny. He admitted that the approach h,,~ r-~spouc;erl 
did conflict with Sherbert, Yoder~ and Thomas. But he argued. that in Light of 
Lee, the Court's decision i.n Yoder, v,'hich involved a similar claim, shouJd he 
considered an anomaly. He also suggested that Sherbert and Yoder ('Quld be 
distinguished. At any rate, he preferred his lenient doctrine228 because 
he believed it would "keep[] the government ... out of the husiness of 
evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims. The risk that 
governmental approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as 
favor·jng one religion over another is an important risk the Establi hment 
Clause t-;as designed to preclude.,,229 It seemed that Stevens was not moti­
vateJ, as Rehnquist ~as, by ideological considerations. Stevens feared exemp­
tions would he seen as religious discrimination. He supported a strict view 
of neutrality that would maintain the strict Lemon test for establishment 
clause cases while scaling back the free exercise clause to lessen the clause confll 
226321 u.s. 158 
22798 u.S. 145 
2281t was actually Rehnquist's lenient doctrine. See Thomas, 450 U.S. 
at 720-27 (Rehnquist, J. t dissenting) 
229 Id . at n. 2. 
230 See P. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 
U.Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1962) (advocating rigorous establishment clause standards 
combined with elimination of free exercise exemptions to achieve governmental 
neutrality toward religion) 
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scrutiny in Thomas, joined the majoritv in Lee. Apparentl v he had T10 prnhlem 
joining an opinion that at: led.st nomjnalh- sanc:tioned strirt scrutinv ifit 
reached the result he sought with his anti exemptions free exerris rlortrine. 
nne mit h;:1.\ f: e'\ pee ted hIm to j 0 inS t eve n SIC0 riC': u r r e n (' e 0 r f i J eon(' () f his 
Ohfl tersely referring readers to his Thomas dissent. 
For several years after 1982, the Court did not decide any cases 
significant to the development of strict scrutiny in the free exercise field. 
The Court did apply the doctrine in Bob Jones University \l. United States 
r) 31 (1983),~ concluding that government's interest in eradicating racial 
discrimination in private education was sufficiently compelling to justify a 
revocation of tax-exempt status for private, religious schools, even though 
tlleir racially discriminatory policies were based on sincere religious 
beliefs. Rehnquist dissented, but he disputed a statutory interpretation nf 
the majority rather than their application of strict scrutiny. 
The Court also decided Susan and Tony Alamo Foundation v. Sec. f)f Labor 
(1985).232 In this case the Court held that religious followers who harked 
for a religious enterprise and received room and board but no wages were 
"employees" for the purposes of federal minimum-wage and maximum-hour requ ire­
ments because their services were economic. The foundation claimed that 
applying the labor requirements to the foundation would violate the free 
exercise rights of the followers, who believed their religion forbade them 
from accepting wages from the enterprise. The Court unanimously held that no 
free exercise analysis was necessary since the labor regulations, if applied 
to the foundation, would not require any significant change in the found­
231 461 U.S. 574 

232471 U.S. 290 
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ation's poJic v of providin,{~ rnomlwl hoard. Fc'rteral n:lps permitt0d rh(~ 
:substitution of these til.ngible itJ:lTIs for hages. Since the foll()wers (lbjected 
on J \" t 0 ~} ag e s, the i r reI i g j ausexere i sew0 u1 (1 not '1 e \. 101 ated h \/ a p p 1 i cat ion 
f the labor standards. 
Through 1985, support for free exercise strict sCf11tin,)' ~la(t not nntice­
ahly shift,~d since the Court handed dot-m Lee. Six justices--Burger, Brennan, 
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor--presumably still endorsed the 
doctrine. Although not objecting to the application of the doctrine in Bob 
Jones University-, in ",-hleh the Court had not granted an exemption, Rehnquist 
and Stevens definitely opposed strict scrutiny and had endorsed a no-exemp­
tions alternative. 233 And Justice White's position remained unclear. He 
had not explicitly objected to strict scrutiny itself since he joined Harlan's 
dissent in Sherbert in 1963. And he had joined in the Court's applications of 
the doctrine since 1981. Nevertheless, he had expressed extreme caution when 
he joined the Court's opinion in Yoder in 1972. And he had found no infringe­
ment of free exercise in McDaniel in 1978, when he based his opinion on equal 
protection. His support for strict scrutiny in the free exercise field did 
not seem totally reliable. So strict scrutiny still commanded a six- or 
seven-person majority by the end of 1985. 
However, that margin slipped significantly in Bowen v. Roy (1986).234 
Two more justices--Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell--endorsed the no-
exemptions, strict-neutrality position for at least some types of free 
233The free exercise considerations in Bob Jones University were not a 
prominent feature of that case. The judicial disagreement centered on whether 
or not the IRS had statutory authority to promulgate a policy tying tax-exempt 
status to considerations of racial discrimination. As a result, the actions 
of Stevens, who joined the majority opinion, and Rehnquist, whose dissent was 
silence on the matter of strict scrutiny, should not be taken to suggest that 
they had changed their positions on the free exercise doctrine. 
234476 U.S. 693 
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rr l'-ie hurciens. And thl::' C(lurt pro\'irled ::t major clarif c'ltjnn ;,f ,"ihcrhert. 
some~hat limiting its reach. 
Tn HoytaNat l v e Americ an par (\ n t (: t-, all en?;edthE' P, n v e r nmen tIs r e qui reInen t 
that he supplv a social securitv number for his daughter in ()rd{~r to r0ceive 
food stamps and other public assistance. He also ohjected to th~' gO\ernfllent''1 
t:se nf any social security number which he might supply or ~"hich the gov(~rn­
ment might simply assign to his daughter. HLS religious beliefs suggf~sted 
that because the social security number was a unique identifier representing 
his daughter, use of the number would '''rob [her] spirit",235 and restrict 
her "spiritual power.,,236 The lower court learned during the trial that 
the government had already assigned his daughter, named Little Bird of the 
Snow, a social security number. The government then contended that the case 
was moot because the damage to her spirit had already occurred, but Roy argued 
that it was the actual use of the number, not merely the assignment, which 
would be detrimental to his daughter's spiritual development. The lower 
courtt finding no compelling reason to deny Roy an exemption from the ntlmber 
requirement, ordered the government not to use the number assigned to LittLe 
Bird of the Snow and barred the government from denying public assistance to 
Roy because of his refusal to supply a social security number. The government 
appealed the lower court's injunction. 
Eight justices agreed that the first part of the court's order, forbid­
ding the government from using the already-assigned number, should be over­
turned. A portion of Burger's opinion announced the decision of the Court in 
this matter. The reasoning constituted a slight revision of the scope of free 
exercise strict scrutiny. Burger cited Douglas concurring opinion in Sherbert 
235 Id . at 698 (quoting Roy) 

236 Id. 
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\-,hat 	 the government cannot do to the indiyiriuai. not in terms oE what the 
II ') 3 7 i fldividual can extract from the ;?,overnment. I - Upon this rat ionaJ e, the 
Court 	concluded that 
rtlhe free E:..:::ercise Clause simply cannot be unde'rslood to require 
the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that 
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just 
as the Government may not insist that [Roy] engage in any set form 
of religious observance, so [Roy1 may not demand that the Govern­
ment join in [his] chosen religious practices. Rov may no 
more prevail on his religious objection to the Government's use of 
a Social Securitv number for his daughter than he could on a 
sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Govern­
ment's filing cabinets.,,238 
Use of the assigned social security number was an internal affair. so the free 
exercise clause did not prevent government from using the number which it had 
already assigned to Little Bird of the Snow. 
But applying Douglas' concurrence to get this result was a bit of a 
sleight-of-hand maneuver. Douglas had not drawn a distinction between 
internal and external affairs of government. His point in his concurrence was 
simply that the free exercise clause did not require the government to 
subsidize Sherbert's Saturday abstinence from labor. It only required a 
religious exemption for Sabbatarians from the disqualification provisions of 
unemployment compensation legislation which government might or might not 
choose to enact. He was actually trying to deal with Stewart's assertion in 
237 Id • at 700 (quoting 374 u.s. 398, 412) 

238 Id . at 700 
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l' no,';' her II e r t t: hat ran the I'm/! t i r, s hmer: t -e j'.lE (\ ,n.. ~ (') 
o n fill ancia1 suppo r t I) f ret 1 0 n . nne ~" Ii U J d hc haX d - p r s s f~ rl t 0 :1 r ?; u e t h} t 
Llutl~;lac;, \-,'ho had supported free (''-;f'rej e empt 10ns in c;;.ses even ,,-,hen no nne 
lse did,239 h'oulrl have endorsed Bur-;:;;er's use 1)[ hi'i Sherh{)rt conr'llrrr:nce 
to .iustif\ a 1 imitat ion on free E"x~\rc i e r('\·i(~T,,;. ThE' Court simp! v llsed 
Douglas' statement to modify Sherbert slightly. No opinion in that case (or 
in any subsequent case) suggested the existence of any internal affairs 
exception to the scope of the free exercise clause. The Court fabricated it 
in Roy perhaps to avoid having to grant an exemption. The lower court had 
held that exempting Roy from the number requirement would create some adminis­
trative difficulties but that they would not constitute a compelling reason 
for denying the exemption. A majority of the justices might have had a hard 
time disputing that conclusion. And without modifying free exercise doctrine 
the waY they did, their only alternative to granting the exemption would be 
handing down another Lee opinion. 
With the primary issue settled, the Court still had to contend with the 
other part of the lower court injunction. which prevented the government from 
denying Roy public assistance because of a refusal to supply a number himself. 
Even though the government had already assigned Little Bird of the Snow a 
number and could use it, there was some question as to whether the government 
might still require Roy to supply it with a number for his daughter before 
granting public assistance. The Court majority disintegrated over this isslle. 
Three justices believed the government could deny benefits if Roy refused to 
supply a number. Three believed that it could not. Two would not consider 
the question. And White simply noted that Sherbert and Thomas controlled this 
239See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 463-75 (1971) and 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 u.s. 361, 386-90 (1974) 
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cas p and dissented: [O!!: "f'[\ h ng trw tither jll'..;r le s ad h8i d on bot h SS\i('-:. 
Burger vdeated the lower court (11'(' is i(ln and rr~rnanded U1C case tn the ; ()~,'('r 
ourt 1,;ithout giving it any clear ':;ii~nai on the <"f'cowl matter. 
B11 r ge r 's pI u r ali t v I) P i rt ion, \>1 hie h Pm,}ellan d Rr~ 
represented an attempt to compromise on frpi'> e'~f'r('i';(~ iurisrrudenc'" In-
retaining strict scrutinv In some cases '-v'hile appl\'ing a pre-('antr"ell:!~'O 
doctrine in cases similar to Braunfelrl (1961). [n Braunfeld, it l",ill be 
recalled. a plurality of the Court declined to apply strict scrutinv to 
evaluate a free exercise claim resulting from an indirect burden arising from 
a generally applicable, secular regulation: the Sunday Clnsing Law. Although 
the Braunfeld plurality did apply Cantwell's least-restrictive-means require­
ment, they did not invoke the compelling-interest standard which was the heart 
· . ?41o f strIct scrutIny.~ Burger pointed out that the burden in Roy Has also 
indirect and non-discriminatory, hut he did not suggest that the Court should 
apply the Braunfeld test in such cases. Burger wanted to apply only a 
rational-basis version of strict neutrality. If the legislation hart a secular 
purpose and if it was generally applicable, then it did not violate free 
exercise if it "is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public 
" lnterest. ,,242 Burger did not include even the least-restrictive-means 
standard of Cantwell and Braunfeld. He did imply, however, that if legisl.a­
tion burdened free exercise directly or was discriminatory, it should be 
evaluated under strict scrutiny. Burger simply held that government could 
deny benefits if Roy refused to supply a new social security number because 
the number requirement "promotes a legitimate and important public interest 
240See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) 
241See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) 
242 Id . at 708 
07 § tJ.. The Erosion 	of Free Exercise Strict: Scrutiny. If 
.. .::.'1/ ..~[ , n l p r (' U-' n t i ng f r ;lud . . 
')1/that goal. '1_,",,4 
Burger incredibly asserted that hls pr')posed d~)('tr TIe \,;ra w'modifica-
R11 r g err E' 1 L f:' d 11,'eH 	 j 1von 0 n P I' a s e, HUll j it 011 1. ('n t,:., ) ( t h (' L i7 i \.,' (' S j rT of 
'J I 5Ca 1 i fo r n i a (1 <)'34 ) . _I The rearet \,j 0 r (' a " n n s t h il t- Burg e r 's r 01 i:lnee I) n t· h!l t 
case \,-!;lS unsound. Tn Ham.i I ton, severa] co lIege students ('hallengerl a uni \,rer 
sitv rE'quirem(~1'lt that all males complete il specifiec\ nnmller of c{)urses in 
nIi lit a r y seenc e and. t a {' t i (" S • nee aus p the un i v e r s j t \' 'l.V' asan arm 0 f the s tat e . 
t.he free exercise cl'.luse did not apply to its actions, and Hamilton preceded 
the Court's incorporation of the free exercise clause into the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment as a restriction on state actions. The Court evaluated 
the students' claim under a very generalized notion that the fourteenth 
amendmf'nt protected against state tnfringement "the right to ('ntertain 
[ reI i 0 us] tw 1 i e f 5, to adher e tor r. eli g i 0 us J p r inc i pIesanJ tot e a c h rr eli ­
. ., 	 ') I 6 
.(~ 11.1 ilS J d (l C t r ne (;) . ".::."1 ~ It \..Jould b(~ wrong to assert that Hamil ton represent­
edt h(' i n(' 0 r ;J0 rat ion i ntot he f [I U r tee nth amendmen t 0 f the f nl1 pro tee t i \' e 
scope uf the free exercise clause. Hamilton did not even suggest that thp 
L)urteenth amendment protections included the secular-purpose or general­
;:tpplicabi.lity standards. A reliance on Ham.ilton Has also troublesome because 
that case was based on a distinction between rights and privileges. While the 
Court admitted that the students possessed at least some type of right to 
religious liberty, it held that such a right was irrelevant because the 
----~-
243 Id . at 709 

244 rd. at 710 

245 293 U.S. 245 

246293 U.S. at 262 
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students did not a.150 possess "J hi tel ':1.+ tl'n:i ol! I·ge. H1<".her 
merelva privilege provided b" Ult" stat,~. T 
.) I­
t h f:' j Tl" a! d i t Y {l f t Iv~ t rl i <; t 1;'1' t (; r~ 1 n ,SOIi (l i rw r !. - .; I '\: p \ (' r t, t) (> ! p s ,-), n : l .' " (' 
'-,tli.;,l!rl r(-\('(lgnilf:.~ a di'1tinctjnn between direct and indirect bunJens. 
8ur:~er ill s eltsappl ied more recent cases \·:hich sU;:J,i':ested that: strict 
<..;('rutin\' dPpl ierl t-o all free exercise burdens. \nv cases, ike fader or Lee, 
1. n h'h l C h the Co u r t r 0. \' i e h e d d irec t bur denson f r e e exere i, s e, B11 r g e r dismiss (' rl 
2.5 inappJ icable to Ror despite language in those decision that did not limi.t 
the scope of strict scrutiny only to instances of direct burdens. In addi­
tion, he tried to distinguish Sherbert and Thomas by arguing that free 
exercise was violated in those cases because the states had provid~d. individu­
alized systems of review in their unemployment compensation statutes bllt h~d 
not granted rei ious exemptions in those administrative processes. Burger 
('iaimecl that the Court applied. strict scrutiny because the refusals to 
accommodate reI igious beliefs administratively suggested IIdiscriminatory 
Ln ten t . ,,2!t8 Brennan had sugges ted that the s t a tu te in Sherber t migh t be 
rliscriminatory, but his formulation of strict scrutiny had not relied on that 
showing. And in Thomas, the state did not exempt any personal reasons for 
unemployment. religious or otherwise, from the disqualification provision in 
its compensation statute. The Court had simply not ~rawn a distinction 
247 374 U.S. at 404 (HIt is too late in the day to doubt that the liber­
ties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing 
of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."). See also n. 6 (collecting 
cases). Even the plurality in Braunfeld had not drawn that distinction. 
Chief Justice Warren had required government to apply the least-restrictive­
means even though operating a business was a privilege. Braunfeld v. Brown, 
366 U.S. 599. 607 (1961). 
248Roy, 476 U.S. at 708 
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~~urger'.., most confusing misappl 'r;ltLn.':1::1 ,1 pr ('t1 :li ll\oL\ed 1-1'1 r eo h' 

n er~:'st in Lh3,t Ci.S(' to just i an indireet burden on free (",ereisl'. Tht1t 
cas e. des p i L e B1] r g e r 's a p p a [f'~ ntheIieft: hat its0 me how S 11PP n r t: e d h l S P [i' P() s! ­
tinn I d iel not dist inguish between el.i rpct and indirect tlllI"aens: It 3ppl ied 
s t r L(' t s t~ rut i ny to ani n eli r ec t 11 u r rl (' n . 
Burger apparently was attempting to rewrite free exercise doctrine in 
Rov. Perhaps, he ~Yas attempting to strike a compromise bet~.;een the Rehnquist-
Stevens no-exemption position and the Brennan pro-exemptions vie~. After all, 
Bllrger seemed to suggest that strict scrutiny and exemptions were acceptable 
\.. :hctl free exercise ~.;as burdened directlv or when indirect burdens resulted 
frnm di rimination, He apparently would only apply his hightv deferent ial, 
str ct-neutralitv standard when indirect burdens resulted from non-discrimin~-
249Burger himself had even ~Titten the Yoder opinion, in which he 
asset'ted that "[tlhe essence of all that has been said and written on the 
subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not 
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of 
religion." 406 U.s. at 215. In other words, the Court had to apply strict 
scrutiny when free exercise was burdened. He also wrote that uEal regulation 
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitu­
tional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free 
exercise of religion." 406 U.s. at 220. He dismissed the notion that 
legislation had to be discriminatory to violate free exercise. This passage 
taken with the other one does not support his new-found proposition that 
direct and indirect burdens merited different standards of review. He did not 
qualify his language in the first passage by adding "unless the legitimate 
burden in only indirect.1t And the "unduly burdens" reference is not equiva­
lent to "directly burdens." The term "unduly" can more safely be taken to 
mean, as it did in Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304, that burdens on free exercise 
were invalid if government could have applied legislative means which were 
less restrictive. The language in every case since at least Sherbert cuts 
against Burger's proposition. 
§ It. Th.~ Erw3i.on of Fn~e Ex('rc;~e Strict Scrutiny. 
~ilstificatinns : ,j 
tiun of free exercise doctrine: 
[ G 1i v e nthe d i ve r sit v 0 f 1)(:, J j \' sin f) u t p l u r ali s t i (' '.., rt',' (1;;1\ 
the necessity of providing (1 rnments '\'it'h uf7'icit'nt n r't r;f, 
. . )ro
of reI lon are J nescapabl e. ~,) 
Clearly~ Burger was responding to the potential of a flood (If disparate 
c J a lIn S . A 1 so, in pre sum j ng t hat " n e u t r a lit y!! H a '5 po S s i, b 1 e. he VTas r e j e c ting 
the pro-exemptions assumption that: the democratic process was structurally 
Lilted toward mainstream religions. 
0'Con:10r, joined by Brennan and Marshall, attacked Burger's plurality 
opinion. She asserted that the test Burger proposed 
has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment 
value to tlle barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal 
Protection Clause already provides. . . . Government must accom­
modate a legitimate free exercise claim unless pursuing an espe­
') s1
clally important interest bv narrowly tailored means.-­
She specifically criticized Burger's reliance on Hamilton and Boh Jones 
Cnll.'ersity. And in the process she decided the case differentlv~ providing 
one of the clearest articulations of the strict scrutiny doctrine of any 
opinion since Sherbert. She pointed out that under strict scrutiny government 
had to show both a compelling interest and what she called a "constitutional 
interest.,,252 She believed that the governmental interest in preventing 
250 Id • at 712. 

251 476 U.S. at 727 (concurring and dissenting opinion) 

252 Id . at 730 (emphasis omitted) 
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ide the case. O'Connor ~'~pl.~jn\.'d: 
Lf t he Government: :':ndd llj('('t its umpc L 1 i 
10 those who lpg timatelv (-' C t t: 0 p r en i ng a S() C La1 Sec 11 r it", 
rJ11m/)('[ '\.\ljl.l d() artY' ha.rm to its cnmpelling interest in preventing 
0) - ') 
'w'P f.l.re f'raud.-')) 
This last requirement Has what slw meant by a "constitutional" interest. 
GO\-t?'-ntnl.'.nt had to show that its overriding purpose was compelling but also 
th(~,t: it had a cumpelling reason for den,)ling a rel iOllS exemptinn. She held 
thaI in Rov's case, government could not present the latter, restating the 
vie ~v t bat admin i s t rat i v e inc 0 n v e n i enc e g ene r a1 J. y did not r i set 0 the Le "I=>} :) ~ 
compelling interest. 254 She would have upheld the part of the Lo~er 
court's order forbidding government from ILenving benefits hecause Rov mi t 
a~ain refuse to provide a numher. In other words, government's assign ng rn1 
use of a number ~ere internal affairs that did not violate Roy's free e~ercise 
rights, but government could not constitutionally compel Rov to supply a 
number for his daughter himself. 
Finally, Blackmun and Stevens would not consider the second question in 
the case because they believed its was either moot or not ripe for adjudica­
tion. They had no reason to believe that the government, since it already had 
253 Id . at 732 

/
25 +Id . at 730-31 (Burger "appears to believe that the added inconve­
nience to the State of administering a selective exemption overbalances any 
burden on individual religious exercise. But this Court has held that 
administrative inconvenience is not alone sufficient to justify a burden on 
free exercise unless it creates problems of substantial magnitude.") 
t 11 '. , \ \ , r. I '~ ~ , ( • (' ~ r, i [ ' ;I 
r !nwn: 
. '):; ­
'-) 'I) r' J 1 Lon ,1rA r:onc j '-; ion. ­
upp nsit i [l il t us!' ric t .s rut in,' j n Lee. h'ass i 1e nt r (~g a u! i n:< B11 r :~ e r ! '''; r r 0 r.:; e (' 
fr::-'e '(l'r ! ::-;e lTlodifLcatjon, but he did r('state his helief256 that SIf'Thert 
and Tl1umas uuld be distinguished from other eases involving indir0ct ')'lr:!ens. 
gur,t~ r h:\d r Lied on a version of the 'jame pr'oJ)()5ition in his plurality 
opinion. In response, Blackmun noted that he r ected Stc\ens' "narrov/ vi.e'h' 
of Sherhert and Thomas. ,,257 
By 1996, free exercise strict scrutinv faced serious opposition on the 
Court. TI.'lojustjces, Rehnquist and Stevens, had announced complete opposition 
to the (l(J('1 r i ne. Two more, Burger :lnd Pm'lel L. \.{anted to 1 tmi t he ins ta:'Y',"s 
in which it would be dpplied. Four still supported the doctrine. So ~h1te 
lJecame d S\v' ng \ote in free exercise cases. In Ro,'v he had not joined. eif:-:er 
he Burger opinion scaling back strjct scrutiny or the O'Connor opinion 
strongly endorsing it. It 'h'as not clear "lhat White's motives \-1ere. In fact, 
another 1986 case showed that he was not an avid supporter of strict scrutiny. 
\t the same time that some members of the Court were trying to limit 
trict scrutiny in Roy, they explicitly restricted the scope of free exercise 
255With Blackmun's endorsement and White's simple reliance on Sherbert 
and Thomas, O'Connor was able to note in her opinion that a majority of the 
Court in Roy believed that Sherbert and Thomas mandated the answer to the 
second inquiry. 476 U.s. at 731. 
256He had first articulated the position in his dissent in Lee. 
257 Id . at 716, n. 2. 
If t:l1 r I t r ~ . 
;q.:; p led s t ric 1. s c r 11 t n \ - j j ; \ (" 
Ii a;?, 112 0 pin inn ,·Ii t h 1a ng 11 <1 g f: t hat S (I met 1 me s sounded 1 i k (~ the Co 11 r t y; :1 sap p 1 v i n g 
~.;! rict s'.'rutiny but sometimes 1 ike it \.·las merely using a reasonable standanl, 
rn 11C h 1 i k p the {) n e Hu r g erar tic u 1atedin Roy. rn 1986, the Court ruled jn 
"mother case involving rrdlitary matters, Goldman L k'einberger. 260 And tlle 
Court left no doubt that strict scrutiny did not apply in Cdses relating to 
the military. 
In this case an orthodox Jew, who was serving in the Air Force as a 
psychologist, sought a free exercise exemption from the military dress code 
Hhich forbade him from Hcaring a varmuU\e. The Air Force's ruLe permi ttf;d 
religious adherents to wear religious items that were covered by the reguldr 
uniform, a ctass of items that did not include a yarmulke. But Goldman 
nf:vp.rthel{~ss, \~-orn a yarmulke for several vears v.;hile nn dutvin hLS .!!lb ;;d 
military hospital, and it had caused no problems. 
A fiv'e-person majority, consisting of Burger, \\'hite. Powell, Hehnqui'~t, 
and Stevens, refused to exempt him from the regulation so that he could \·;'ear .'1 
yarmulke. Rehnquist, writing for the majority, !f:asoned that the Court "must 
give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities 
concerning the relative importance of a military interest.,,261 Rehnquist 
258401 U.S. 437 
')r::9
_.) 415 U.S. 361 (1974) 
26°475 U.S. 503 
261 Id. at 507 
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that t1'1I' mil it.ify'S ir1 tf't'(,<'0t: In r:1ainL-tinin,o, uniY(lrmit~/ and min :ni,'­
ing individualitv justified the regulation, ;llth()u;~h Rehnqulst in no Kav 
suggested that the interest ,-,°as compel} ing. He did :I'Jt applv strict ('rutin)'. 
HI" contended that the Court had to bf:' "far more d·:,fi.~rf'ntial!' h) m l.i:ar', 
1(>:~111atio[Js chall nged on first amendment grounds thail to (:j·il . n st [ut()s. 
because "[tlhe military need not encourage debate ur tol ate protest: to the 
. . . . . . ,,76?
extent that such tolerance 1S requIred of the clv1l1an state. - - The 
requirement: of uniform appearance he.1ped the military to "foster instinctiv 
ohedi :lee, unity, commitment. and e':)prit de corps,,263 by suhverting indi­
vidual differences among soldiers. Rehnquist concluded that the visibility 
requirement "reasonably and evenhandedly regulate[d] dress in the interest of 
the mjlitary's perceived need for uniformity. 11264 Rehnquist had not artic­
ulated a precise judicial test to apply when soldiers challenged military 
rul f'S under the free exercise clause. But he seemed to suggest that as long 
as a rule has generally applicable and reasonably related to some goal that 
~'i1S legitimate "in the professional judgment of military' authorities" it v:as 
not unconsi.tutional. 
Brennan and O'Connor filed biting dissents criticizing the majorLty. 
Brennan accused Rehnquist of applying a "subrat i onal-bas i s standard" with 
"absolute, uncritical deference,,265 to military authorities "by eliminat­
ing, in all but name only, judicial review of military regulations that 
in Lerf ere wi th fundamental const i tutional rights of service personnel. ,,266 
262 Id. 

263 Id . 

264 Id. at 510 

265 Id . at 515 (dissenting opinion) 

266 Id . 

he 5implv aT5~1Ii>d 
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. ')67that there was no reason to ~pplv a standard other than strict scrutlnv.-
Brennan also suggested that strict scrutiny ShOllld be applied, but he asserted 
that the Air Force had not even met a minimal starldard of credibilitv. 168 
Noting thdt military regulations did not r('-'quire complete unitormitv ;in\'~~av. 
Brennan believed the Air force couJd permit visible religious garments, like 
yarmulkes, as long as they were "consistent with a polished, professional 
'1 . 11')69m! ltary appearance. ~ 
Neither Stevens, who filed a concurring opinion, nor Blackmun, who also 
dissented, liked Brennan's standard. Stevens feared that Brennan's test would 
encourage military authorities to draw distinctions between religious adher­
ents based on more than just the appearance of the item they sought to 
270wear. Blackmun also feared unconventional religious requirements would be 
discriminated against precisely because they were Jess "familiar to the 
a \1 P. r a~ e 01) s e r \. e r . ,, He d . t t_ houg, b he d . d no t 1)e .leve + he_ ' 27 1 Issen eCI,1 h ecause 1 _ I' ;,: 
267 Id . at 528-33 ("Sapoleon may have been correct to assert that, in the 
military sphere, morale is to all other factors as three is to one, but 
contradicted assertions of necessity by the military do not on the scales of 
justices bear a similarly disproportionate weight to sincere religious heJiefs 
of the individual..") (citation omitted). 
268He mocked the reasoning which the Air Force supplied and Rehnquist 
accepted: "Non-Jewish personnel will perceive the wearing of a yarmulke by an 
Orthodox Jew as an unauthorized departure from the rules and will begin to 
question the principle of unswerving obedience. Thus shall our fighting 
forces slip down the treacherous slop toward unkempt appearance, anarchy, and, 
ultimately, defeat at the hands of our enemies. The contention ... surpass­
es belief." Id. at 516-17. 
269Id . at 520. 
270 Id . at 513 ("[T]he difference between a turban or a dreadlock, on the 
one hand, and a yarmulke on the other, is not merely a difference in 'appear­
ance'--it is also the difference between and Sikh or a Rastafarian, on the one 
hand, and an Orthodox Jew on the other."). 
271 Id . at 527. 
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Air For c e had f'mp i r j c a 11 Y dem0 n " t rat t t hat s '1c h ;1 I a r g e n u m b f~ r r \ f ;) r< T" ':i 0 n n (~ 1 
"lOulrl. seek religious exemptions from the dr(~ss crHl(' U-ut an'·' sub:;t:ant: aJ 
prohlems would result. 
mental po] icies ",ere inherently til ted to favor mEl.instream reI ig ns. HE: 
trnngly pressed this position: 

The vLsihLlity test permits onl.v incHviduals ,,,hose outer garments 

and groooling are indistinguishable from those of mainstrpam 

Christians to fulfiL! their religious duties. In my vic~,', thp. 

Constitution requires the select jon of criteria that permjt the 

greatest possible number of persons to practice their faiths 

')~')
f r E' e1\- . - / ­
~\' i t: h t his s tat eme nt, B r e n nan s t r 11 Ckat the cor C 0 f the phi 10-; 0 phi cal rl i sag r e e ­
ment concerning considerations of judicial difficulties in ctefjning religions 
and fcrretin.\~ out false claims. Some judges and 1 scholars~ Stevens 
ludeci, sour,ht to eliminate all free eXt'rcise exemptions in ~)art because the 
court's couLd not ensure that (~very conceivable reI igious objector Houlct he 
fil~rlY accommodated. Brennan, while no doubt cognizant of the limits of 
judicial pOlver, supported exemptions, even if the most obscure faiths might 
not receive a fair hearing, because he sought to maximize opportunities for 
religious exercises. And given the structural favoritism for mainstream 
religion anyway. Brennan saw no merit in a position which called for no 
exemptions in the name of neutrality: 
What puzzles me is the implication that a neutral standard that 
could result in the disparate treatment of Orthodox Jews and, for 
272 [d. at 521-22 
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example, Sikhs~s more tr!lllbl(~ omp or unfair than the existing 
neutral standard that dues result in the different treatnwnt of 
Christians, on the one hand, and Orthodox Jews and Sikhs on the 
other. The practical effect of this r isibilitvj catcgc 
zation is that, under the guise of neutrality and (;venha.ndelinf>'1S, 
majority religions are favored over distinctive minority faiths-
Justice Stevens believes that this standard advances an 
interest in the "uniform treatment" of all religions .... 
[T]hat uniformity is illusory, unless uniformity means uniformly 
accommodating majority reI ious practices and uniformly rejecting 
distinctive minority practices. . . . A critical function of the 
Religion Clause~ of the First Amendment is to protect the rights 
of members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majori­
tarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and 
practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar.,,273 
Brennan in this cJpinion providerl the learest ever Court statement of the 
philosophical justifications for the pro-exemptions approach. He even noted 
that members of a minority faith were constitutionally entitled tu free 
exercise exemptions when burdens on their practices are "the result of 
,,274insensitivity rather than design .. But his words had not been 
sufficient to sway the majority, not even Justice White. 
In the 1970's, the Court had seemed to consider prisons and the military 
somewhat similarly in that the Court should maintain a greater degree of 
273 Id . at 521, 522. and 524. 
274 Id. at 524. 
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deference to the o\'erni n,~ aut h() r i tiE' S ~,f the. ins tit u ion"..:..!) fr: J ight 0 
that past recognition, it should not be sut'prising that one \'ear arter Goldman 
t h (' (' 0 U [' t dec i cl e d a f r e e ex ere i s e r. a s e i n \' 0 1 v i ng p r i sone r sand dec! i n e rt t n 
applY strict scrutiny. 
In this case, O'[one L Estate of Shabazz (19B7),276 a 
by Rehnquist disagreed with a minority led bv Brennan about the proper 
standard to apply to prison circumstances. This case ":as not especially 
significant to the development of strict scrutiny since neither Rehnquist nor 
Brennan suggested that the Court applv it. And the Court of C011rse had 
already suggested in 1972277 that a narrower free exercise standard should 
be used in prison cases. The dispute in this case really resembled a less 
controversial version of Goldman, with Brennan arguing that the Court should 
apply more than the hare minimum standard adopted by the Rehnquist majori­
278 The only real broader significance this case holds for the develop­
ment of strict scrutiny is that Brennan emphasized the centrality of the 
impaircrt religious practice to the prisoners' religion. The Brennan wing 0 
the Court later began to invoke a similar centrality standard in mainstream 
free exercise cases at the next Term. 279 
275Compare Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) and G.illette \'. United States, 
401 U.S. 437 (1971) with Cruz \'. Beta, !t05 1I.S. 319 (1972). 
276482 U.S. 342. 
277 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). 
278They debate actually centered on the proper interpretation of the 
prison standard which the Court had adopted in a case from another field in 
the same year. See Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). 
279See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 t;.S. 660 
( 1988) . 
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The Court also heanl ,:-mclher ll~lenrplo\'fnent compensati n claim in 1()87. 
Tn Hobbie \I'. Unemploy'ment Appeals Comm 'n, 280 another Se\'enth-Dav Adventi st 
was denied benefits when she Has fired from her joh for refusing to "':orl.:: on 
Saturday. Hobbie differed from Sherhert" onl '\ in thH.t he re I Ldous ohjectnr 
hd.d converted to the Seventh-Day Ad\'(,,:rlt. ist fai th aftpr inning her jnh, 
she, rather than the employer, ,,:as "'the agent of change. ",281 Also the 
disqualification was onlY partial. The Court held, eight-to-one, that there 
\~'as "no meaningful distinction among the situations of Sherhert, Thomas, and 
')8 ?Hobbie."-'" Only Rehnquist dissented, adhering to his Thomas opinion. 
Apart from its reaffirmance of Sherbert and Thomas, the Hobbie opinion 
added one other development to the evolution of strict scrutiny. Brennan, in 
his opinion for the Court, mentioned Burger's contention in Roy that strict 
scrutiny should not be applied to cases involving indirect burdens. But 
Br nnan asserted that "[f]ive Justices expressly rejected this argument in Ro." 
[and] [wle reject the argument again today. Powell, who had sided with Burger 
lfl Ro), refused to oin Brennan's opinion. He noted that Burger had rlistin­
guishecl Sherbert and Thomas so that Brennan had no reason to even consider 
much less reject Burger's test. 283 Stevens also filed a separate concur­
rjrlg opinion, once more pressing his position that the exemptions in Sherbert 
and Thomas v"ere only necessary to maintain equal treatment. 284 
280480 U.S. 136. 

281 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1055 

282 Id . at 1049. 

283Burger had stepped down in 1986, so he was not on the Court for the 

Hobbie case. 
284He had made the same argument in his Lee dissent and in his Roy 
concurrence. 
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'\nv seeming rein\'igoration of upport for ~;tr1(>t scrutiny i Hohbie ,,:as 
misleading, Burger ha.d not rf~mained (in the Court to hear the Hohbie ('fISC. He 
stepped dO'Y:n in 1986. Reagan e] €\/ated Hehnquist to replace him anc! appointed 
Justice Scalia to fill Rehnquist's associa.te justice '.;eat. \] tho Scalia 
.joined Brennan's majority· opinion i.n Hobbie, he soon pr-ovecl that he '",as nn 
') 8­friend of strict scrutiny. -< ') The replacement of Burger proved to be verv 
significant. Where Burger had tried to formulate a free exer~ise compromisE' 
in Roy, the new Chief was not at all interested in preserving strict scrutiny. 
The replacement of Burger's more moderate voice with Rehnquist's and the 
filling of Rehnquist's seat with an ideological mate shifted the Court further 
from a pro-exemptions stance. In addition, Powell's moderate vote was 
replaced in 1988 by Justice Kennedy's, which in free exercise cases was 
eventually cast with Rehnquist and Scalia. 286 As a result of these changes 
in the Court's membership, the Brennan-O'Connor pro-exemptions wing of the 
Court did not loose any members. Marshall and Blackmun remained on the Court. 
But the anti-exemptions wing became more categorically opposed to strict 
sc'rutiny. Burger and Powell had been the only justices seeking to moderate 
free exercise doctrine while retaining strict scrutiny in a significant class 
of cases. After 1987, the pro-compromise moderates were gone. By 1988, then, 
the Court was sharply divided: four justices favored strict scrutiny, four 
opposed it, and White held the balance of power. 
In 1988, the Court scaled back strict scrutiny again by extending the 
internal-affairs exception that it had created in Roy (1986).287 In Lyng 
285See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 
(1990) 
286 Id . 
287476 U.S. 693 (1986) 
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\1ativ(: American group challenged the C.S. Forest ()(-:rv'ce's decision to build a 
ro,Hl through an area of a national forest. The ar0<l, knov..'n to the \atlve 
Americi':lnS as the "high country," was rentral tn their rel igiolls pra:'t l P':" 
Coo s t rue t Lon 0 f the r 0 ad t hr 0 ug h t h(-: II h i g h co u n t r v" '~'J 0 :.11 d ':>0 f 1! <.) r 11 r t t h (' a r 0 a 
that it would seriously frustrate the tribes' abil to practice their rite-
specific reI ion. The Court heJd that government use of public lands was an 
internal affair which objectors could not challenge on free exercise grounds. 
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for a five-to-three majority. She 
and White broke from the Brennan camp in this case, and Kennedy did not 
participate. She believed that her opinion was a straightforward extension of 
the logic of Ro.-v. She noted that in neither Roy nor Northwest Indian '\lOuld 
the affected individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating 
their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize 
religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, 
1 f" I' 'I . d b h .. ,,?89l)ene Its, ane prIvl eges enJoye Y ot er CItIzens .... The majority 
placed heavy weight on the fact that government was not furcing a choice on 
the Native Americans, as it had done in Sherbert and the other free exercise 
precedents. They were not being coerced into violating any tenets of faith. 
Sherbert had to choose between her Saturday abstinence and unemployment 
benefits. The government policy in Northwest Indian did not present the 
objectors with such a choice. The government was simply building a road on 
its land. 
The majority was also influenced by two other factors. First, the 
challengers asked the Court to distinguish Roy on the ground that the burden 
288 108 S.Ct. 1319 

289 Id. at 1325 
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(In religious exercise in Vorthr"(H,t Tnd.ian '\.·~as much ~reater than the hurrlen \,:;.:..:; 
tn RD.""" But O'Connor noted that the Court could not delve into the truth or 
falsity of religious beliefs. Inherent: limits to .iadicial powC'r in the 
religion field prevented th(~ Court from ,9, ttin:y. inside the reI ~nns of 
hall e.nge.rs and r1et~rmini ng \·;hether the injurY in nne case i·,OU] d he morf~ 
severe than the injury in another. Second, the majority was constrained 
the possibility of future claims, more demanding than the one in this case. 
O'Connor noted that the Native Americans might decide that they could not 
practice their reI ion if outsiders were permitted in the area. She ~as not 
willing to set a precedent which might have led eventually to granting tribes 
"de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public 
property.,,290 She further noted that even granting the claim in this case 
would significantly impair governmental property rights by forbidding the 
construction of a road any-where in a 17,000 acre area. The Court could not 
grant such a religious veto over land-use decisions of the U.S. Forest 
Service. 
Brennan, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, dissented. He argued 1'hat the 
Court should apply strict scrutiny in this case. He disputed O'Connor's 
assertion that unless government coerced or penalized an individual's exercise 
of religion the free exercise clause was not violated. He argued that anytime 
government hampered an individual's ability to exercise his religion, it 
violated free exercise. However, O'Connor rightly pointed out that Brennan 
had torn a quote from Yoder out of context to support his position. He 
claimed that the Court's decision in that case was based on the potential that 
secondary education for Amish children threatened the continued existence of 
the Amish faith. In fact, the Court placed much more emphasis on the coercive 
290 Id. at 1327. 
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natL:re nf the compulsory l,~dUCd.t ion! 1n Yor!Pl". It cnmpell('d the Amish 
parents to violate a tenet of faith. Trw 2.()v(:rr:.mental po] ic'\- in ,Vorthr,,'f'st 
Jlldian did not coerce thE' Nati\(-'\mer1cans, eithE'r directl,,; or indirectly. to 
(1.0 anvthir:s. 
f',rennaTl also argued that the Court could determine h'hich pubLic lan(t 
II 1 " ". l' b1 \I? 91 t . l\i' • l' .vere centra. or InClspensa. e - 0 certaIn ~atlve AmerIcan relglons 
and apply strict scrutiny only to interferences with those areas. Again, 
O'Connor warned against judging the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. 
She sllggested that if the Court adopted Brennan's position, it might find 
itself in disagreement with religious adherents and end up ruling that they 
"misunderstand their own religious beliefs.,,292 
However, Brennan did present a legitimate argument regarding Roy. It 
could be distinguished, he believed, because the activity in that case was 
completely internal while the activi ty in Northwest Indian 'vas external. And 
ohviouslv the activities in the two cases were of different natures. O'Connor 
did not adequately refute this contention. She suggested that the use of the 
social security number in Roy could not be considered any more internal than 
the activity in this case. The effect in Roy was to drain the spirit of Hov's 
daughter; that effect, O'Connor suggested, could not be considered internal. 
However, the Court had noted in Roy that in judging constitutional claims "the 
Constitution, rather than an individual's religion, must supplY the frame of 
reference.,,293 To argue that the activity in Roy was as external as that 
in Northwest Indian, O'Connor had to do exactly what she had stridently 
opposed doing--get inside the religion of the challenger to evaluate the 
291 Id. at 1338. 

292 Id . at 1330. 

293 Roy, 476 U.S. at 701, n. 6. 
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1.n a governmental computer S'lstem is cLear! \' mon~ i.nternal t'han huilding il 
~'uad through a national forest, (?ven if the rO;·.d is l",-hollv Hithin the bound­
aries of public proper The Court could have drah'n a distinc,tion. hut it 
!TIay not have heen enough to change the olltCr)me. 
This case might have presented a perfect situation for a modified fr e 
exercise doctrine. O'Connor noted that the Forest Service had evaluated 
several proposed routes for the road and had chosen the one which it believerl 
interfered Hith the religiolls practices of Native Americans the least. This 
fact of the case might have suggested a compromise. In cases like Northtv'est 
Indian and, perhaps, even Roy, where a governmental activity will have a 
negative impact on religious practices but does not coerce anyone into 
violating their tenets of faith, the Court might require government to use the 
least restrictive means available without substantiallv undermining its 
interests or increasing its costs. But the Court might not require government 
to demonstrate that its interest was compelling. It is questionable whether 
or no t the gave rnmentaJ interest in constructing the road j n :Vorthr.ies t Indian 
could have been considered compelling. But if the Forest Service had not 
chosen to try to accommodate the Native Americans religious practices as best 
it could, it should have been required to do so bv the free exercise clause. 
In another Native American case decided at the same time as Northwest 
Indian, the Court cut back free exercise strict scrutiny in yet another way. 
In Employment Div. t Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith (1988) (Smith 1)294 the 
Court first reviewed the case involving sacramental use of peyote. It will be 
recalled that two Native American's were fired from their jobs with a private 
drug rehabilitation center when the center learned of their religious use of 
294 108 S.Ct. 1444 
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,{ I 
deemed their sacramental dru;-~ us tu 1)(~ "m:';(' ~l(hH't:1f hithin the frH';lrling f 
The (;ourt sp it i.n the S(.lme manner that it had in Vnrthr.;est fnrlian. 
O'Connor iind Hhite Joined Rehnquist, Stevens, and Scalia in the majority, and 
Brennan. ~arshall, and Blackmun dissented. HavIng not taken his seat until 
after oral argument, Kennedy, again. did not participate. Also, again, the 
majority did not apply strict scrutiny, while Brennan, in dissent. argued that 
it should have. 
Stevens, ~ho wrote the majority opinion, asserted that Sherbert, Thomas. 
and Hobbie did not control the case, because the conduct engaged in by the 
religious objectors in those cases had not been illegal. The majority simplY 
held that if Oregon exempted the religious possession or use of peyote from 
its general drug laws, then the Native Americans' conduct 
may ~;ell be entitled to constitutional protection. On the other 
hand, if Oregon does prohibit the religious use of pevote, and if 
that prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution, 
there is no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon. If 
that is the case, the State is free to withhold unemployment 
295compensation. . 
So the majority ruled that if a state has validly prohibited some form of 
conduct, then religious objectors who are fired for participating in that 
conduct can be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, even if 
their participation was required by their religion. But the prohibition 
295 Id . at 1451. 
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Ctiurt was not certain if Ore'?;t)t1 pro\,: idee! all ;~xempt:ion for sacramental peyote 
lj''';{C." it remaIlded the case to the state supreme court for a decision on this 
issue. 
Br e n nan \1.,' r {) t e the dis sen tingop i nion, d r g 11 i n,0; t hat the c: nu r t shC) 1l ! d h a'.' e 
simply applied strict scrutiny and decided the case. He explained that law 
enforcement was not the purpose of Oregon's unemployment compensation law, so 
preventing illegal activity could not be considered a compelling interest. 
Protecting the unemployment fund from fraudulent claims was the onlv conceiv­
able governmental interest justifying the disqualification, and Sherbert, 
Thomas, and Hobbie forced the Court to conclude that protecting the fund was 
not a compelling interest. But the majority opted, instead, to foreclose the 
potential for strict scrutiny analysis in another class of free exercise 
claIms. 
One year after Sm.i th I, the Court decided yet another unemployment 
compensation claim. In this case, Frazee v. TJlinoi5 Dep't of EmpJovment Sec. 
(1989),296 a unanimous Court held that Illinois could not disqualifv an 
individual from receiving benefits because his religious objections were not 
grounded in the tenets of an organized sect. The claimant declined to take a 
job which was offered him because it woulrl have required him to work on 
Sunday. Because he called himself merely a Christian but did not rlaim any 
denominational affiliation, he was denied benefits. The Court simplY heJd 
that affiliation with an organized religion was not necessary for one's 
beliefs to qualify for free exercise protection. 
So in the last free exercise case of the 1980's, the Court unanimously 
extended previous free exercise rulings. But that positive note for free 
296 109 S.Ct. 1514. 
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L • '10 r ~ :IIpU r tHl 1.1 support for trict scrutiny (,tntl frf'f' ('xercisf' p'\~('mp-
t i(l[l had ernded from almost unanimous '3upport in 1()78 to a hare majority of 
just;cP"'~ if that bv the end of the 1<;[30'5. No, the C(1urt's unanimous sIlPPc1rt 
r() I:"; I r its(' rut i Ii V i fl l'ra,; e e \>,a s far from rep res en tat i \ e of the 1<) 8 0 I S trend. 
The unanimity ~"as ~lso only a hrief period of calm before the storm. The 
5mi th ,ase would soon return from the lower court. 
§ 5. TIlE DEMISE OF' FREE EXERCISE STRICT SCRUTINY. 
As the Court entered the 1990's, it rf'mained deeply clividerl. O\'E': fr t? 
exercise strict srrutinv. Brennan, Marshall, ;lOcI Blackmun still strongly 
backed the doctrine, and O'Connor returned to thi p0siti,on ft'('f h r bri(~t 
foray into the Rehnquist camp. Rehnquist, Stev~ns, Scalia, and Kenne(iv ais 
formed a powerful bloc in opposition to strict scrutiny. But \':hit{~. the 
perennial free exercise vacillator, finally appeared to decide against strict 
s rutiny in 1990. He firmly joined with the Rf~hnqllist bloc to "irt:lall,­
abo] ish free exercise strict scrutiny in what surelv must have heen nne nf th 
most riisingemwus, results-orientr:d opinions in rr::,~ent histurv. The ase :.i 
, . ')c)7.
th,:' ell rt 's final de c i ':,j () n i nthe Sm1 the a s e , -" '--7 h 1 c: h had r e. t urn e d fro m 

t! 1e ] r) \., e [- C f) U r t. \v i t h Sea1 i a wT i t j n g tlw 0 pin ion, a La U" Inii j n r i t. Ij fils t i (' l' C, 

p f f f' (' t Lvel y read the t r e e e ,~ e r cis e c.l aus e 0 l.i t 0 f the Con s tituti 0 n, m 1 s rep C'~ ­
sent precE'dents all along the \-,ray. 

The Co urtfacedthe que s t ion i n Sm j t h T I 0 f \-; he the r 0 r not the f r ~ E" 
exe rc i se clause requ i red the Conr t to exempt ~a t i \'e Amer i cans f rom Of(~g01'1 I ~~ 
han on peyote use, including use for reI igious purposes. Since several ,::;t t'es 
had statutory exemptions for sacramental peyote us 98 and apparently en­
countered no significant problems with the policy, the Court might have 
applied strict scrutiny and held that the free exercise clause required an 
297Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 
298 See Smith II, 110 S.Ct. at 1606 (citing statutes). 
.~ r;. The nemis{~ of Free EXPf('lse Strict Scn!tiny. 1(lq 
Or the Cou r t mig h t s imp 1. y h a v e d ppl' (' d s tic t c r 11 ~ l n \" a r d Iie t (' r m.i r' e d ttL} t 
preventing drug use was a compell fig int est which jllstified the irlfr (~mcnt 
" ')00() f\ a t i \ e :\mer i {'an f ff~ e ex ,-3 IT 1 S e r ..., . ;\It: rnat'ive!v, it ;';Jll1d rnn" 
tions of conduct posing an inherent, suhstantia.! risk to publ i(' safet\.' "'Jlll;1 
be upheLd \,lithollt the necessity of applying a strict stand:trd uf reviN:. 301 
But the majority did not opt for any of these approaches to this [':;tSC. 
Instead, over t.he tgorous dissents of O'Connor and Blackmun, SC3.li<1. 
deleted strict scrutiny from free exercise jurisprudence and ne;ltly 0rased it 
from hi.stnrv. He establi.shed a standard of review which had absclutelv no 
basis whatsoever in free exercise precedents. Under the new approach~ 
generally applicahle, secular La~s were immune from anv free exer~ise chal­
} pr:ge no mat:te~' hm·; severel,' Lhf'Y mi.o;ht hurden an individual's 
-::' h e '3 t ric t s c r Il t i In' '';' tandard '3 I) f comp e 11 i ng - i n t ere s tandIe;Ls t " C' s t r i. (' t i \ e ­
ti ns rum t:hl~s la~';s, and ~,;ould not grant religious e>;:empti.ons i.n ;), Deral. 
c\cept frum a narrcJ\{ly sp(~('ificd range of cases. In reaching h:s result, 
Scalia misrepresented or misapplied more than a half-dozen free f'xerci~p 
prEcedE'nt~. 
299This method of basing a free exercise conclusion in part on the 
experiences of states with statutory exemptions has been applied before. See, 
e.g, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407, n. 7 (1963). 
3000 'Connor took this course in her opinion concurring in the result. 
ld. at 1613-15 
301 374 U.S. at 403 ("[T]he Court has rejected challenges under the Free 
Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by 
religious principles. . . . The conduct or actions so regulated have invari­
ably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.") 
3021595 U.S. at 1599. 
:i S. The Dpmise of Free EXf.~rcise Strict Scrutiny. 
1" Jill' th "h I '! ~."·l·',!I'·'·L"~[\.. c;,tr'~{}-
1. t '., caJ. lng . em V11I" Ie ."'~., , 
s ~ 11d r c () mpu1so r v ed 11cat ion 1a\.: 'b; 1t ; rn T) (: ..:, (> d 
r 'h 
prf"s Lng itc'ill u Scalia's ag(:'nda. He i.lss(~rted that Yoder had been based on 
!l(Jth the free e\E'rctse clduse and the parental rlght to priv'lcy..As a result:. 
it ,las not d pure free exercise case but y;as a "hybrid. I, Yoder had heen based 
In part on parental privacy, but the opinion was clearly divided into two 
segments. One applied strict scrutiny to deal with the free exercise chal­
lenge to the compulsory law itself. After the Court found that no compelling 
reason existed for denying an exemption, it had to deal with the ~t te's 
additional claim that since the case involved children! parcns patriae all;)\r;! 
the state to assert pow'pr over the Amish children. The Court cLC'].rl <: :lS,. . C' 
paI P ntal right. to prjvacy to (Espose of that std.t;~ cJaim, The\' re dj~·,t: 
f3Ct. since hildren here not involved in Smith II, the parental pri\'ac"" 
section of Yoder was irrelevant~ a.nd its free exercise portion should have 
controlled. It required the Court to apply strict scrutiny to the drug la~. 
Scalia also dismissed CantweJ1 304 and Murdock,305 both of i-Jhich 
endorsed the least-restrictive-means standard, as "hybrids." But Cantwell 
also had combined two distinct challenges. A statute providing for adminis­
trative censorship of religion was struck down on free exercise grounds. And 
303 Id. at 1602. 

304Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) 

305Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) 

1 1 ~T h f~ n('mi Sf' 0 f F r e (' K'<: (' TT i s e S tr i c t S c rut i ny . , , 
Cu t app l i ~I.t 
I)f a Jehovah IS \·;i tness for a ('oramflr;-lin·l 'nc'dch (;f the ;)0('1('('. 
opinion contilLned 
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',:as t h 
t hat r e qui r p d i WI, i v i d u a 1 · s topa v a f 1 ;1 t - rat eli en <.; i ni?, t 'J. x r I) S (} 1 i (' it. r' 
Co u r t nut edt hat i i n t e r fer e d \'; i t h h() t h r r e e exere i sea r:d f r e e ;" res s r ,'~ h t 5 
l)t1t nOhher In LL-: rul !'; t: E' rl 
tu the fesul t. In fact, in the mid-1940 r s th(:' (~ourt tpuded to 1 ump First 
amendment liberties together in their opinions. For instarwe, t :{',,, 
Rutl Hfute during this period that "rrlt: may be doubt(,ci th,lt :1n',' of thf' 
;:,reat liberties insured by the First Articlp can lJp gl,re hi:~h(::r (' than 
th;" ( I h{~c'1. \11 h;., p pref"'lI'ec1 poc; l t· ion in our has it '.;chprrv~ .. 
U;i.\ '.:;tri,ct '. l\d Ln,\i \';3S limited to the unemployment compl:nsatiun ficJrt. .~ 
Ofr tl \- pointed out that the Court had only "purported" to appl v the 
cloc rine in Gillette and Lee. But he went heyond this point, suggesting th:'.17 
,)ut side t'he unemployment compensation field the Court had either only "pur­
ported" to apply the doctrine or had not applied it at all. He miSrE':lrescnted 
precedents to support this proposition. He presented RO'yand Northr·/e"t Tnrfian 
as though they were typical free exercise cases, merely commenting that 
declined to apply Sherbert's analysis,,307 in them. He even had the gall to 
impl y that 0' Connor was obviousl y mistaken in claiming that Rosr and Northwest 
306prince v. i\fassachusetts, 121 U.S. 158,164 (1944) 

307 110 S.Ct. at 1602. 
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had eentererl on h'hat: tvp\~ of morf! dt~fer(~ntial sLu;cLlrd the C;,lnrt.:;h::l d ppl 
heC;lUS of the <;pec i"ll ci rcumstances. '\ P!' of trw cases hf' i teel. r n.l ! I,d 
Thev e;J,ch ccns~,itutecl narrov,;lv defined px.cl?ptions for sp('cia.l in.-.;:tances. He 
dJSO nC5~L' ted I:u mention that the Court had truly appllf!d strict scrutiny in 
p,() h J 0 II e 5 en j l'Cr 5 it., (1 98 3) and f 0 U n d aleg i t: i mat f compe! 1 i n g 1 n t ere s t. I t 
~as a straLehtforward application . 
.X::; fur tht.> unemployment compensation case Sea ia 'lrc:~\ a hoie! } it,f 
,H ,wei them, h i g h t j ng them ass pee i ali ns tanc e sin "'j hie h the Co u r t h a ci 
lli)nestl\' dPplied strict scrutiny. He relied on Burger's r~st:ricted vic'" nf 
lhe cas s in the ROJ' plurality opinion to set them apart. Buc~er's posit;on 
had been that strict scrutiny applied in instances of rlircct hurrlens and in 
~'ase'-; 1,.-:here indirect burdens were discriminatory. The Court applied strjet 
~crutinv in unemployment compensation cases because the state's refusal to 
accommodate religious practic~s, even though it had established a 5vst~m of 
individualized review, suggested a discriminatory intent on the part of the 
states. Burger set aside cases where general laws burdened free exercise 
indirectly for evaluation under a standard less rigorous than strict scrutiny. 
Scalia adapted this view, suggesting that strict scrutiny "was developed in a 
308 Id . at 1603, n. 2. 
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n G r m . The t rile pic t 11 r e \-; as {) n e 1) f '3 t r t s c rut in" ilS t. her E' e e ...~ ,." 1 S r~ '1 f) r ;] 
it h na,rrcnvl y def: Tj(~d e~cept ,i ons for ; ntcrna.l gov·crnmenL.'l af d rs ,'l.Ed 
~fte.r he related his distrnte! \'i 1)1: 
1n t 0 ShE' r h ..~ r t s () Im~ 1"'f be\'0 n d the 11 n e m pI 0\Tn e n t compensat i 0 Tl fie ) d, ",7 e \,-0 u1 d 
~lot ;:,pply it to require exemptions fr()m a generally ;ipplicab E' criminal 1a';.-7. 
h-e conclude todd~' that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord 
ith the \C1St majority of Ollr precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to 
S '.](·'.h· ('1.,.;)1.lc'rl"'~I'.S.,.,,·\11 	 . f ' _. ! ~L.~ J ThE' Court had he td in Sml til [ that i. Oregon 5 cr :n1 
r:;d ba.n on pevote use was const'itutional t so was its denia.l of unemployment 
!H':'nefits to the Native American challengers in the Smith case. "':el1~ :lpp1 Lng 
the new trict-neutrality doctrine, Scalia refused to exempt \ative Americans 
frpm Oregon's han on peyote use and consequently upheld the denial of bene­
fits. 
Scalia provided a fe"",' theoretical justifications for his position. He 
noted 	that 
[a]ny society adopting such a system [of exemptionsl would he 
courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion 
309[d. at 1603. 
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anot r ma ter. 
t hn r e ; it [. ttl(-' 1 e \: e 1 0 f for c e cl confor ill i tv, v: h i C' h s (' ems 1 ike a Ii res rip t i. 0 n 
[r,r trouhlp. ~oreover, he sought to avoid a doctrine that would require thp 
Court t.o constant Lv {j,nalVIe legislation for compell ing interests i.n the face 
of free exerci~e challenges. He concluded his opinion with little sympathy 
for memllers of reI iOlls minorities: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the polit:cal 
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious 
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoirlabJe 
consequenre of democratic government must be vreferred to a system 
in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges 
weigh the social importance of all laHs against the nt: red i ty of 
I , 1'" " b l' f 313a ~ re 19lOUS e .le s. 
Al though Scal·j a fashioned a str iet-neutral i ty test in Smi th [1, ~1e real Lzed 
that strict neutrality actuallY meant structural discrimination against 
minority sects. It simply was not an important enough consideration to 
involve the courts in its resoJution. And on that note, he abolished strict 
scrutiny. 
------_._-.--------­
312 Id . at 1605. 
313 Id . at 1606. 
CONCLUDING RR~ARKS. 
In an opinion founded on misrepresentation, the Court killed free 
exercise strict scrutiny in one stroke. With it really went the free exercise 
clause, as well. Strict scrutiny had given the clause a unique scope of its 
own. It had been important as a balancing force against the structural 
discrimination of majority rule, which even Scalia tacitly acknowledged to be 
real. Without the doctrine, the clause itself was reduced to a protection 
against religious discrimination, a spare equal protection clause. The free 
exercise clause no longer had any independent meaning. 
There were obviously problems with strict scrutiny. Its mandated 
exemptions might conflict with the establishment clause. But it seems th~t 
any resolution of that conflict should have come at the expense of the 
establishment clause. To resolve the conflict by altering free exercise 
doctrine required the radical surgery Scalia administered in Smith II. \fo 
free exercise policy short of the elimination of exemptions would have 
definitively brought it into line with the commands of establishment clause 
doctrine. But only slight modification of the interpretation of that clause 
would have permitted the fullest construction of free exercise. The problem 
with clause conflict, it seems, is how to distinguish between acceptable forms 
of accommodation of religion from unacceptable forms establishment clause 
doctrine that in the abstract recoqnizes none. 
Concluding Remarks. 116 
,-\ second funclamenta,l probll'm \,ith iT' ( . rei (' '::; t ric t '::> C rut i \" ~~ n t '~ (1 
a r 0 11 n cl the inher e n t 1 i In ita t ionson t: he Cu u r t 's ail i tv t [) eval U;l t ere 1 L ~ 1. 0 U s 
LIII S • Par t 0 f the prob 1 f~ m i s t h ;:..l tit has d iff leu1 t ,\/ de· fin i ng reI ? ion and 
rec()5~nizing ffirlr-gina.l sects. But this problem seems to he a h t. ()\' r.stat"c'cL 
As !',renni'{n poi :lIJ~d out in Goldman. ;1 rule that appeal'; to h~' n:;"utra C'a:l cf en 
favor the Christ an mainstream. That results from the structural hias of 
democracy. And he asked of Stevens, how one discriminatory rule was fairer 
than another. People ~ho argue that the Cuurt should not g ant any exemptions 
because its cannot be ahsolutely certain it ""'ill never overlook one sect are 
following Stevens' reasoning. They fail to r ze that a no-exemptions 
policy also results in discrimination. Recognizing judicial limiL:ttions and 
the possibilities of discrimination under both approaches, Brennan sought to 
maximize religious libert\r. Under such a theory the Court should not be 
deterred from granting free exercise exemptions because it might overlooK In 
olJscurf' faith. It should accommodate every belief it can genuinely rf>(~ogtliLf: 
as J~giti~ate. This approach might result in a small amount of judicial 
,li':icriminatjr-m, hut a no-exemptions policv would subject every clearlv 
legitimate yet non-mainstream faith to the structural discrimination of 
d(~m()('racy simpl because a few fringe religions might not be judicially 
n~c().'5nizable. That position does not seem rational. 
Another part of the problem is that the Court cannot always ferret out 
fraudulent religious claims. But there are ways around this difficulty. ~any 
claims are clearly legitimate. In almost every free exercise case reaching 
the Supreme Court, the government had not challenged the religious objectors 
sincerity of belief. Other claims are fairly easy to reject as motivated by 
117 Conc:uding RemarKs. 
e c u 1arc 0 n c erns . '3 1 4 The prob 1 em ;1 r s sith the cIa1ms t hat fa 1]. ~ the 
i.ndeterminate zone in the middle. Ho\.--.evc, t.he Court CGuid establ ish a pol it 
to avoid in depth examination of those claims. It c()ulcl opt to~imp1 :lC ept: 
any claim which it cannot reasona~dy '(")ncl:_ldc c be 
grant exempt i n'", ~n .some bogu'"J Cl tlrS .. in.: it 
ness of the exami.nation of sincerity, to \-:hjen (.;ome justices, most nctahl\~ 
Stevens, have objected. 315 
But these consi.derations did not seem to be driving the erosion of 
strict scrutiny in the 1980's. 1n5tea..:. changes in the poJ itical cJ imate. the 
ideological agendas of some justices, and changes in Court membership more 
adequatel v account for the eventual demise of the doctrine. And the anfortu­
nate result may be not only structural bias in the democratic proces but 
intentional sllppression. The strict scrutiny doctrine and relig~ous exemp­
tions evolved gradually as the Court gained experience in the fr~e exer isc 
field. The suppression of Jehovah's VJitnesses in the 1940's Has one experi 
~nce thilt probably shaped the outlooks of at least three justices. They 
ultimately decided that the Gobitis316 decision, implicitly sanctioning 
such discrimination, had been wrongly decided. 317 
31~See, e.g., Da'vis v. Page, 385 F.Supp. 395 (197 /+) (rejecting parents 
challenge to school curriculum requirements when parent's initial written 
objection was based primarily on consideration of personal or political 
preferences) 
3151n fact, in United States v. Ballard. 322 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) 
(holding courts could not determine truth or falsity of religious beliefs, 
only the sincerity with which they are held) (Jackson, J., dissenting), 
Justice Jackson argued that courts should not even investigate sincerity, but 
should accept religious claims at face value. 
316310 U.S. 586 (1940) 
317 See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 611-12 (1942) (Black, J., 
dissenting) 
Con(:luding Remarks. 1"'8 
The new doctrine Scaiia fdShionf':.t in Smith i[ ~ad no an;do;~i.lf' in 
history, so its potential impact on society is not cleiir. HO\·,7ever, U~e 
c 1. 0 S est a p prox i mat ion tot he Smith I [ t est j s ;H 0 1., ;1 b 1 v thE' (]0 bit i S' 1ecis i :~m . 
But even in that case, it \,.jIll lH? recalL:,d, Frankf rt:<~r '. s i fl,lPrlc,"'\ he 
of discrimination against the Jehovah's ~;itnesses in the earl,,- :9l~O'<.,.\nd 1n 
the 1990's, there are 3 host of religious minorities, like ~~tive Americans, 
vhf) ('Duld easily h8come. tht~ modern (~ounterpart to the Jehovah f s !,'?i tnec;sc'..; nf 
t.h 19't() , '-i. The Rd1!lquist ~{ing of the Court may have given history a cha.nce 
to r itself. 
